Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

CashRansomware

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK15Techniques
IOCs20Tracked
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
Cash LLC

Our experts managed to intercept a pre-release sample of a new Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) variant called “CashRansomware” which is currently in active development.

via tehtris blogtehtris.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

The sample is a .NET PE executable intended to be executed manually.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

If no network communication is available, CashRansomware adapts by storing the decryption key in the registry

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The software copies itself to the Start Menu’s Programs Startup folder, automatically executing each time the system boots up.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

The software copies itself to the Start Menu’s Programs Startup folder, automatically executing each time the system boots up.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The data flow and control flow of the sample are obfuscated using Eziriz .NET Reactor.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

It also detects the presence of sandboxie and any.run sandbox... The malware has anti VM features and can detect if the “Manifacturer” contains “microsoft corporation” or “vmware”

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

CashRansomware is programmed to avoid infecting systems located in Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. This selective targeting is achieved through geolocation checks and system language settings

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

The malware employs time-stomping techniques to detect the presence of a sandbox environment. By manipulating file timestamps or monitoring system clock discrepancies, it can identify anomalies that are typical of the execution of a sandbox.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

The malware includes a very simple anti-debugging function.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

If no network communication is available, CashRansomware adapts by storing the decryption key in the registry

Discovery

5 techniques
T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence1

Every device connected to the compromised computer is systematically explored by enumerating drive letters. This process allows the malware to identify and target additional storage devices, such as external hard drives, USB drives, and network shares

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

It also detects the presence of sandboxie and any.run sandbox... The malware has anti VM features and can detect if the “Manifacturer” contains “microsoft corporation” or “vmware”

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

CashRansomware is programmed to avoid infecting systems located in Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries. This selective targeting is achieved through geolocation checks and system language settings

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

The malware employs time-stomping techniques to detect the presence of a sandbox environment. By manipulating file timestamps or monitoring system clock discrepancies, it can identify anomalies that are typical of the execution of a sandbox.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

The malware includes a very simple anti-debugging function.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

Every device connected to the compromised computer is systematically explored by enumerating drive letters... external hard drives, USB drives, and network shares, to maximize the scope of its encryption campaign.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The sample establishes communication with its command and control (C2) server through the encrypted messaging platform Telegram.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

As the ransomware is communicating the new victim status over Telegram... it is possible to intercept the API key from the ransomware and directly communicate with the API.

Impact

3 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

It autonomously encrypts files on the infected system and subsequently displays a pop-up window demanding cryptocurrency payment for decryption.

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence1

The sample is able to delete system restore points as part of its evasion and persistence strategy.

T1491.001Internal DefacementEvidence1

In addition to encrypting files and displaying a ransom note, CashRansomware also modifies the desktop wallpaper to reinforce its presence and demand for ransom.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

20 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching20Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping15Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.