Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

Ovidiy Stealer

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK12Techniques
IOCs18Tracked
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
TheBottle

the individual claimed responsibility for creating several malware families, including Odysseus Project, Evrial, Ovidiy Stealer, and several others.

via paloalto researchcenter historicresearchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence1

We believe that Ovidiy Stealer is currently being spread via email as executable attachments, compressed executable attachments, and links to an executable download.

Execution

1 technique
T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

We believe that Ovidiy Stealer is currently being spread via email as executable attachments, compressed executable attachments, and links to an executable download.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

Ovidiy Stealer is written in .NET and most samples are packed with with either .NET Reactor or Confuser.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

It is also likely spread via file hosting / cracking / keygen sites, where it poses as other software or tools. In several cases, we observed the Ovidiy Stealer bundled with a “LiteBitcoin” installer... Other observed filenames are listed below and include game lures, hack tool lures, social network lures and others.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Ovidiy Stealer is modular and contains functionality to target a multiple applications -- primarily browsers... Example displaying the code for locating and stealing stored FileZilla passwords

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

Ovidiy Stealer is modular and contains functionality to target a multiple applications -- primarily browsers -- listed below. FileZilla Google Chrome Kometa browser Amigo browser Torch browser Orbitum browser Opera browser

Discovery

2 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

The initial C&C beacon is a POST reporting the following details: ... cn: Windows username

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The initial C&C beacon is a POST reporting the following details: id: DiskID and ProcessorID ... os: Operating system and version

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

We observed the Ovidiy Stealer bundled with a “LiteBitcoin” installer... spread as “litebitcoin-qt.zip,” bundles Ovidiy Stealer and another RAT

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Ovidiy Stealer utilizes SSL/TLS for communication with its command and control server. It currently utilizes the domain ovidiystealer[.]ru for its command and control (C&C) communications;

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The initial C&C beacon is a POST reporting the following details... Ovidiy Stealer traffic also includes a hardcoded User-Agent

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

If the stealer is able to find passwords from targeted applications, it will follow up its initial checkin with another request reporting the passwords of targeted applications

Indicators of compromise

Observables

18 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching18Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping12Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.