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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The attacks, which we dubbed Operation In(ter)ception based on a related malware sample named “Inception.dll” ... relied on social engineering over LinkedIn and custom, multistage malware.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Custom multistage malware used in Operation In(ter)ception. Stage 1 is a downloader that retrieves, decrypts, and executes Stage 2 in memory. Stage 2 is a modular C++ backdoor that communicates over HTTPS with a custom protocol, supports configuration updates, module loading, host fingerprinting, and command execution, and uses obfuscation and anti-analysis techniques.
Custom multistage malware used in Operation In(ter)ception. Stage 1 is a downloader that retrieves, decrypts, and executes Stage 2 in memory. Stage 2 is a modular C++ backdoor that communicates over HTTPS with a custom protocol, supports configuration updates, module loading, host fingerprinting, and command execution, and uses obfuscation and anti-analysis techniques.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.