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Mallory
Malware2 associated CVEs

Thor.dll

Tracked since Aug 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns2Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK8Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2020-1472via fortinet threat researchZerologonThor.dll This DLL attempts to authenticate with credentials from the previous Zerologon dump and create domain accounts attempting to masquerade as healthmailbox accounts. It also creates a role-based access control (RBAC) assignment within Exchange that gives it the ApplicationImpersonation role built into Microsoft Exchange.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-34473via fortinet threat researchProxyShell: Microsoft Exchange Pre-authentication Path ConfusionThor.dll This DLL attempts to authenticate with credentials from the previous Zerologon dump and create domain accounts attempting to masquerade as healthmailbox accounts. It also creates a role-based access control (RBAC) assignment within Exchange that gives it the ApplicationImpersonation role built into Microsoft Exchange.View vulnerability →Source ↗
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

FortiGuard Labs recently discovered an unidentified threat actor leveraging ProxyShell exploits... web shells created from ProxyShell vulnerabilities.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1136Create AccountEvidence1

This DLL is used to authenticate to the domain, modify security permissions, create domain accounts... Thor.dll attempts to authenticate with credentials from the previous Zerologon dump and create domain accounts attempting to masquerade as healthmailbox accounts.

T1505.003Web ShellEvidence1

Exploit details, from the directories to the types of web shells used, matched almost verbatim. The difference was when web shells performed post-exploitation activity via DLLs loaded into memory...

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

FortiEDR detected these DLLs because they loaded into memory space allocated for vbc.exe... The figure below shows w3wp.exe injecting a thread into the vbc.exe process

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

create domain accounts attempting to masquerade as healthmailbox accounts.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

FortiEDR detected these DLLs because they loaded into memory space allocated for vbc.exe... The figure below shows w3wp.exe injecting a thread into the vbc.exe process

Discovery

1 technique
T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

The figure below shows w3wp.exe injecting a remote thread and accessing services on an Exchange server.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1550.002Pass the HashEvidence1

The DLLs... were used to perform active reconnaissance, obtain hashed passwords via Zerologon, and perform pass-the-hash authentication to establish persistence via Exchange Application Impersonation.

Collection

1 technique
T1114Email CollectionEvidence1

This allows the actor to access and send email from any mailbox within the environment.

Mallory platform

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matchingMatch every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping8Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.