Malware

PwnPOS

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

When supplied with the "/install" argument, the malware installs itself as a service for persistence and auto execution during Windows startup

Persistence

1 technique

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Persistence - Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (T1543.003)

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Once a target process has been located the shellcode parses the memory for credit card track data

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Persistence - Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (T1543.003)

Stealth

1 technique

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Once a target process has been located the shellcode parses the memory for credit card track data

Credential Access

1 technique

T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

there is evidence to suggest that the actors employed various remote access tools and credential dumpers to gain initial access, move laterally, and deploy the malware in the POS environment.

Discovery

1 technique

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

The shellcode will then enumerate the processes running on the system and specifically look for process names which contain partial names of specific POS software.

Collection

1 technique

T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Once a target process has been located the shellcode parses the memory for credit card track data (specifically Track 1 & 2 data)

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Hashes

3 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 years ago

hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app—

hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app—

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

2 SOURCESView more in app

sentinelone blogNews

Jul 22, 2021

CVE-2021-3122: Catching Threat Actor Exploiting NCR POS

Point-of-sale malware found on the client's systems during the credit card theft investigation. Listed artifacts include ALOHAPROXY.EXE and wnhelp.exe.

usa visaNews

Aug 14, 2026

POS malware that drops itself to disk, installs as a Windows service for persistence, logs execution behavior, scans process memory for payment card data, validates card numbers with the Luhn algorithm, and writes Track 1 and Track 2 data to a plaintext log file.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

Start free trial

IOC matching3

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping6

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

Malware

PwnPOS

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

When supplied with the "/install" argument, the malware installs itself as a service for persistence and auto execution during Windows startup

Persistence

1 technique

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Persistence - Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (T1543.003)

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Once a target process has been located the shellcode parses the memory for credit card track data

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Persistence - Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service (T1543.003)

Stealth

1 technique

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Once a target process has been located the shellcode parses the memory for credit card track data

Credential Access

1 technique

T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

there is evidence to suggest that the actors employed various remote access tools and credential dumpers to gain initial access, move laterally, and deploy the malware in the POS environment.

Discovery

1 technique

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

The shellcode will then enumerate the processes running on the system and specifically look for process names which contain partial names of specific POS software.

Collection

1 technique

T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Once a target process has been located the shellcode parses the memory for credit card track data (specifically Track 1 & 2 data)

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Hashes

3 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 years ago

hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app—

hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app—

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

2 SOURCESView more in app

sentinelone blogNews

Jul 22, 2021

CVE-2021-3122: Catching Threat Actor Exploiting NCR POS

Point-of-sale malware found on the client's systems during the credit card theft investigation. Listed artifacts include ALOHAPROXY.EXE and wnhelp.exe.

usa visaNews

Aug 14, 2026

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching3

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping6

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.