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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
A Go tool called p2pwn chained two real flaws, CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2021-33045. Neither needs a valid password. After either bypass, the tool installed a hidden account.
A Go tool called p2pwn chained two real flaws, CVE-2021-33044 and CVE-2021-33045. Neither needs a valid password. After either bypass, the tool installed a hidden account.
11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Output format: pwned.txt: ... Credentials: {login}:{password} ... methods.cve-2021-33044 , methods.cve-2021-33045 - Extracts admin credentials
Output format: pwned.txt: ... Credentials: {login}:{password} ... methods.cve-2021-33044 , methods.cve-2021-33045 - Extracts admin credentials
The hidden account “survives a password change and, on most firmware, a factory reset.”
methods.cve-2021-33044 = true # CVE-2021-33044 methods.cve-2021-33045 = true # CVE-2021-33045 ... methods.cve-2021-33044 , methods.cve-2021-33045 - Extracts admin credentials
methods.brute = true # Credentials brute force ... [ brute ] # Credentials brute force configuration credentials = [ { login = " admin " , password = " admin " }, { login = " 666666 " , password = " 666666 " }, { login = " 888888 " , password = " 888888 " }, { login = " admin " , password = " admin123 " }, { login = " default " , password = " tluafed " }, ]
The relay establishes the route without prior authentication, leaving login checks to the device's web application... a valid Dahua serial number could be used to establish an Easy4IP relay path before the connected device performed its own credential check, allowing a device behind NAT to become reachable through the vendor's relay infrastructure.
4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Go-based Dahua camera exploitation tool that chains authentication-bypass vulnerabilities to access devices without credentials and install a persistent hidden account.
Go-based tool/backdoor used in the CameraSwarm operation to bypass authentication on Dahua IP cameras and install a persistent backdoor account via RPC that survives password changes and factory resets.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.