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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The researchers also discovered a previously undocumented backdoor called ‘BridgeAgent,’ which Fire Ant disguised as a legitimate Zabbix monitoring agent. The backdoor persists as a root-level systemd service and supports TLS reverse shells and the execution of additional payloads on the compromised host.
6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
BridgeAgent... polled the attacker's infrastructure over TLS on port 443 for commands and reverse-shell instructions.
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A previously undocumented Linux backdoor masquerading as a Zabbix monitoring agent. It persists through a root-level systemd service, provides TLS reverse-shell access, and can execute additional payloads on compromised hosts.
Linux backdoor masquerading as a Zabbix monitoring agent. It persists through a root-level systemd service, disguises its process as gnome-shell, and polls C2 infrastructure over TLS/443 for commands and reverse-shell instructions.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.