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Malware3 associated actors

1C-Shell

Tracked since Sep 4, 2026 · Updated 5 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days4 mentions · peak 3 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK2Techniques
IOCs2Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
Post exploitationReconnaissance
Platforms
Windows

1C-Shell is a malicious external-processing component for 1C:Enterprise, distributed as an EPF file. It provides command-execution and administrative capabilities on compromised servers, allowing attackers to execute system commands and scripts, perform file operations, enumerate users and roles, and issue SQL queries. Operations run with the privileges of the 1C server process.

1C-Shell is used by the financially motivated groups Citrus Ransomware and Toy Ghouls in attacks against Russian organizations. Toy Ghouls uploads it to insecurely configured 1C:Enterprise servers, while Citrus uses it for command execution after server compromise. It supports reconnaissance and post-compromise control of enterprise application infrastructure. In these intrusions, insecure 1C configurations and access involving privileged support personnel or administrators also facilitate privilege escalation and lateral movement. Although deployed in ransomware operations, 1C-Shell is a command-execution backdoor rather than a file-encryption payload.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Toy Ghouls

When the group compromises 1C:Enterprise servers, it uses external data processors (1C-Shell) to run commands.

via malware newsmalware.news
Citrus

When the group compromises 1C:Enterprise servers, it uses external data processors (1C-Shell) to run commands.

via malware newsmalware.news
Citrus Ransomware

When the group compromises 1C:Enterprise servers, it uses external data processors (1C-Shell) to run commands.

via securelistsecurelist.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

2 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

The group abuses insecure 1C server configurations to upload 1C-Shell external-processing files.

Execution

1 technique
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

1C-Shell allows execution of system commands and scripts; the group also uses PowerShell, Windows command shell, and Bash.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching2Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping2Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.