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Malware1 associated actor

DXSCAN

Tracked since Sep 16, 2026 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days2 mentions · peak 2 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK24Techniques
IOCs9Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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BlackHatSect0r

In Part I, that model drove DXSCAN , a custom Go platform that generated targets across 12 countries and reached roughly 727,000 hosts.

via socradar blogsocradar.io
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

24 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

4 techniques
T1593.002Search EnginesEvidence1

Targets are sourced partly through a large curated search-engine dork corpus aimed squarely at leaked configuration files and cloud keys.

T1595.001Scanning IP BlocksEvidence1

Every ten seconds the panel generates 1,200 random IP addresses across twelve target countries, checks them for life on ports 80, 443 and 8080, fingerprints the CMS, and scans for exposed secrets.

T1595.002Vulnerability ScanningEvidence4

Certificate and DNS harvesting, path scanning, account validation

T1596.001DNS/Passive DNSEvidence1

A corpus of 2,759,860 domains built from passive DNS and certificate transparency was fed through the scanner.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1585.001Social Media AccountsEvidence1

Telegram served community and recruitment, C2 notification, exfiltration, victim notification, monetization, and automated reporting functions.

T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

The exposed server contained a custom Go command-and-control platform, phishing tooling, WAF-bypass tooling, token forgery utilities, and harassment automation.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

The operation used an AI agent to “scan for exposed secrets, test stolen access, and feed results into a custom control platform.”

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence2

The toolset referenced public proof-of-concept material for CVE-2021-3129, CVE-2018-15133, CVE-2022-22947, CVE-2021-29447, and CVE-2026-42530; however, “no confirmed breach [was] based on a new flaw.”

Persistence

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

The operation used an AI agent to “scan for exposed secrets, test stolen access, and feed results into a custom control platform.”

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

The operation used an AI agent to “scan for exposed secrets, test stolen access, and feed results into a custom control platform.”

Stealth

2 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The MITRE mapping identifies a garble-obfuscated C2.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence3

The operation used an AI agent to “scan for exposed secrets, test stolen access, and feed results into a custom control platform.”

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1110Brute ForceEvidence1

The crew attempted Drupal brute-forcing, brute-forcing of citizens’ fine reference numbers, and credential stuffing against a private individual’s accounts.

T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

Amazon seller OAuth client secrets and third-party reporting-service credentials were harvested into the credential vault.

T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence3

“Confirmed access came from public cloud buckets, exposed .env or Git files, default signing keys, or secrets placed in browser code.”

T1606.001Web CookiesEvidence1

PBKDF2 derivation material shipped in a client-side Angular bundle allowed the actor to mint valid HS512 tokens and receive HTTP 200 from the state token endpoint.

Discovery

1 technique
T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence2

“DXSCAN generated roughly 1,200 random addresses every ten seconds, checked ports 80, 443 and 8080, [and] identified web software.”

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

The crew claimed bucket, Git, application, database, email, and KYC data extraction from victim environments.

T1114.001Local Email CollectionEvidence1

The SNOSM claim included ministry SMTP credentials and recovered mailboxes, including deleted items dating to 2021.

T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

Seven worker daemons ran continuously, including a scanning worker pool and a dedicated key hunter covering 18 secret types across eight providers.

T1213.002SharepointEvidence1

The report states that the operation relied on “exposed cloud storage” and that confirmed access came from “public cloud buckets.”

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

DXSCAN was exposed on port 8080 and used HTTP/API functionality; the phishing infrastructure was published through an ngrok tunnel.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence2

When exposed credentials or configuration data were found, the platform “sent French-language victim reports through Telegram.”

T1102.002Bidirectional CommunicationEvidence1

Telegram bots and a private chat were used for C2 notification, exfiltration, and victim reports.

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence1

The C2 exposed a reverse-shell listener on port 4444 alongside the web-based C2 services.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

DXSCAN pushed French-language 'VICTIME' reports containing harvested credentials to a private Telegram chat; verified SMTP and database credentials triggered additional notifications.

T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence1

The MITRE mapping lists Telegram exfiltration and file-transfer services.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

9 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching9Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping24Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.