DXSCAN
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
In Part I, that model drove DXSCAN , a custom Go platform that generated targets across 12 countries and reached roughly 727,000 hosts.
Techniques & procedures
24 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Reconnaissance
4 techniques
Reconnaissance
Targets are sourced partly through a large curated search-engine dork corpus aimed squarely at leaked configuration files and cloud keys.
Every ten seconds the panel generates 1,200 random IP addresses across twelve target countries, checks them for life on ports 80, 443 and 8080, fingerprints the CMS, and scans for exposed secrets.
Certificate and DNS harvesting, path scanning, account validation
A corpus of 2,759,860 domains built from passive DNS and certificate transparency was fed through the scanner.
Resource Development
2 techniques
Resource Development
Telegram served community and recruitment, C2 notification, exfiltration, victim notification, monetization, and automated reporting functions.
The exposed server contained a custom Go command-and-control platform, phishing tooling, WAF-bypass tooling, token forgery utilities, and harassment automation.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
The operation used an AI agent to “scan for exposed secrets, test stolen access, and feed results into a custom control platform.”
The toolset referenced public proof-of-concept material for CVE-2021-3129, CVE-2018-15133, CVE-2022-22947, CVE-2021-29447, and CVE-2026-42530; however, “no confirmed breach [was] based on a new flaw.”
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
The operation used an AI agent to “scan for exposed secrets, test stolen access, and feed results into a custom control platform.”
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
The operation used an AI agent to “scan for exposed secrets, test stolen access, and feed results into a custom control platform.”
Stealth
2 techniques
Stealth
The MITRE mapping identifies a garble-obfuscated C2.
The operation used an AI agent to “scan for exposed secrets, test stolen access, and feed results into a custom control platform.”
Credential Access
4 techniques
Credential Access
The crew attempted Drupal brute-forcing, brute-forcing of citizens’ fine reference numbers, and credential stuffing against a private individual’s accounts.
Amazon seller OAuth client secrets and third-party reporting-service credentials were harvested into the credential vault.
“Confirmed access came from public cloud buckets, exposed .env or Git files, default signing keys, or secrets placed in browser code.”
PBKDF2 derivation material shipped in a client-side Angular bundle allowed the actor to mint valid HS512 tokens and receive HTTP 200 from the state token endpoint.
Discovery
1 technique
Discovery
“DXSCAN generated roughly 1,200 random addresses every ten seconds, checked ports 80, 443 and 8080, [and] identified web software.”
Collection
4 techniques
Collection
The crew claimed bucket, Git, application, database, email, and KYC data extraction from victim environments.
The SNOSM claim included ministry SMTP credentials and recovered mailboxes, including deleted items dating to 2021.
Seven worker daemons ran continuously, including a scanning worker pool and a dedicated key hunter covering 18 secret types across eight providers.
The report states that the operation relied on “exposed cloud storage” and that confirmed access came from “public cloud buckets.”
Command and Control
4 techniques
Command and Control
DXSCAN was exposed on port 8080 and used HTTP/API functionality; the phishing infrastructure was published through an ngrok tunnel.
When exposed credentials or configuration data were found, the platform “sent French-language victim reports through Telegram.”
Telegram bots and a private chat were used for C2 notification, exfiltration, and victim reports.
The C2 exposed a reverse-shell listener on port 4444 alongside the web-based C2 services.
Exfiltration
2 techniques
Exfiltration
DXSCAN pushed French-language 'VICTIME' reports containing harvested credentials to a private Telegram chat; verified SMTP and database credentials triggered additional notifications.
The MITRE mapping lists Telegram exfiltration and file-transfer services.
Observables
9 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.