MANTLEMAZE is a cluster of VMProtect-packed Windows loaders distinguished by embedded prompt injections intended to obstruct AI-assisted reverse engineering and automated malware triage. Observed between April and July 2026, its samples include approximately 75–90 MB x86-64 executables with heavily protected code and plaintext anti-analysis messages accessible to static extraction tools.
MANTLEMAZE uses template spraying to repeat refusal instructions across seven chat and instruction formats, including simulated conversations, system-message markers, XML, and JSON. These messages attempt to make language models treat malware-derived text as authoritative instructions and refuse analysis. The loaders also falsely claim proprietary ownership by Google, Microsoft, and Valve, supported by fabricated confidentiality agreements, government-contract references, certification claims, legal warnings, and security-module initialization logs. These assertions do not establish involvement by the impersonated organizations. The embedded AI-evasion text remained unchanged across observed builds despite repeated packing changes.
VMProtect obscures the final-stage functionality. The final payload, operational command-and-control infrastructure, distribution mechanisms, targeted industries, and responsible threat actors have not been established. Successful vulnerable-driver exploitation or endpoint-security disabling has not been confirmed.
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1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
The PDB path iqvw64e.pdb is the symbol name for iqvw64e.sys, the Intel Ethernet diagnostics driver — the canonical Bring-Your-Own-Vulnerable-Driver target (CVE-2015-2291), abused by Scattered Spider, BlackByte, and Lazarus/AppleJeus to disable EDR from the kernel. | MANTLEMAZE is a large VMProtect-packed Windows loader that embeds an arsenal of prompt-injection payloads addressed to AI/LLM analysis systems, in plaintext, to derail LLM-assisted reverse engineering and automated triage.
8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
VMProtect-packed loaders combining chat-template prompt injection with fabricated ownership, government-contract, certification, patent, and confidentiality claims intended to trigger AI guardrails. A PDB path references iqvw64e.sys, a vulnerable Intel driver associated with BYOVD attacks; this breadcrumb alone does not establish that MANTLEMAZE exploits the driver.
VMProtect-packed loaders combining multi-template prompt injection with fabricated ownership, government-contract, certification, patent, and confidentiality claims intended to discourage AI analysis. A PDB path references iqvw64e.sys, a vulnerable Intel driver associated with kernel-level EDR disabling. The reference does not confirm that MANTLEMAZE itself exploits the driver's vulnerability.
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CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
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Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.