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Mallory
Malware

AVERAT

Tracked since Oct 2, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK26Techniques
IOCs13Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Platforms
LinuxNetwork device

AVERAT is a modular Linux remote access Trojan observed on Taiwanese network-edge appliances, including mail-security appliances from ShareTech Information. It provides remote command execution, file transfer, host reconnaissance, and traffic proxying. Its capabilities include directory traversal, resumable file retrieval, chunked uploads, recursive deletion, process enumeration and termination, appliance reboot, and up to ten concurrent interactive shell sessions. Operators can extend its functionality by loading shared-object modules and modify command-and-control destinations, ports, and callback intervals at runtime.

AVERAT disguises command-and-control communications as outbound email traffic. It normally connects over TCP port 25, issues SMTP EHLO and STARTTLS commands, and then establishes its own encrypted session with shared-secret authentication. Its TLS implementation uses a fixed ClientHello template. Connection settings are stored in an encrypted configuration, and typical callbacks occur every 600–699 seconds. During check-in, the implant reports the hostname, current user, operating-system version, network interfaces, and logged-in users.

Observed deployments use an ELF installer after access to the appliance has already been established. The installation chain launches AVERAT and a watchdog component, then deletes the staged executables while their processes remain running, reducing file-based forensic evidence. AVERAT also supports proxy and port-forwarding channels through the compromised appliance. Some builds communicate through compromised Taiwanese consumer and small-business devices serving as relay infrastructure. No specific threat actor attribution has been established.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1584.008Network DevicesEvidence1

The three IP addresses recovered from the configs represent compromised CPE belonging to third-party victims rather than intentional operator assets.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

An outbound relay terminating SMTP-disguised implant traffic, and an inbound routed VPN foothold into the host's own LAN.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

912 Open an interactive shell session — up to ten concurrently.

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

1010 Load or unload a shared-object module, extending the implant.

Persistence

1 technique
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

An outbound relay terminating SMTP-disguised implant traffic, and an inbound routed VPN foothold into the host's own LAN.

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Strings are hidden with a rotating substitution alphabet.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

It carries four AES-128-ECB blobs keyed on the first sixteen bytes of SHA1("ShareTech").

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

The SpamSniper /var/run/spamsniper.pid mutex, together with the sample provenance, ties this build to the South Korean cluster.

T1070.003Clear Command HistoryEvidence1

VIMINIT="set viminfo=", HISTFILE=/dev/null, HISTSIZE=0, and HISTFILESIZE=0.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

The script then copies two malicious binaries from /addpkg into /sbin as ntpdate and udevds, runs each, and unlinks them ten seconds later.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

That key seeds RC4's key-scheduling algorithm, and the resulting S-box is used directly as a keystream.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

The interval is stored in a hidden file at /var/lib/.db and can be changed by the operator, persisting across restarts.

Discovery

5 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

Each reports hostname, current user, OS version, network interfaces, and logged-in users.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

Each reports hostname, current user, OS version, network interfaces, and logged-in users.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

629 Enumerate running processes with command lines.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Each reports hostname, current user, OS version, network interfaces, and logged-in users.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

20 Enumerate directory contents; 30 Recursively walk a directory tree, resolving file ownership.

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

T1005 Data from Local System Dropper

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1008Fallback ChannelsEvidence1

The schema provides three host and port pairs; this build populates one.

T1071.003Mail ProtocolsEvidence1

The implant connects outbound to port 25 and speaks SMTP: it issues EHLO, requests STARTTLS, and only then begins its own encrypted session.

T1090ProxyEvidence1

1618 Open a proxy or port-forward channel through the appliance.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

22 Upload a file to the host in chunks, appending on resume.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

The command interface relies on the same cryptography (HMAC-SHA1, AES-CBC) and opcodes as the standard Tinyshell/Rekoobe.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1030Data Transfer Size LimitsEvidence1

22 Upload a file to the host in chunks, appending on resume.

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

21 Download a file from the host, with resume support.

Impact

2 techniques
T1489Service StopEvidence1

632 Terminate a process (SIGTERM).

T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence1

The reboot handler calls sync() before forcing a restart through the kernel rather than through init.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

13 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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rapid7 blogNews · Oct 16, 2026Rapid7 Intelligence Wins the 2026 Péter Szőr Award for Outstanding ResearchA Linux implant identified in follow-on research into threats targeting telecommunications and network-edge environments. The content does not describe its specific capabilities.Read more ↗mkd cirtNews · Oct 7, 2026Linux бекдорите се претставуваат како алатки за безбедност на е-пошта за да избегнат детекција во Кореја и Тајван | MKD-CIRT | Национален центар за одговор на компјутерски инцидентиPreviously unreported modular Linux implant deployed through an ELF dropper on Taiwanese ShareTech devices. It disguises command-and-control communication as SMTP, contacting mx.zxopfds[.]com over TCP port 25 every 600–699 seconds. Capabilities include file transfer and deletion, directory enumeration, process inspection and termination, interactive shells, device rebooting, dynamic module loading, proxying and port forwarding, and runtime changes to C2 configuration.Read more ↗the hacker newsNews · Oct 6, 2026Linux Backdoors Impersonate Email Security Tools to Evade Detection in Korea and TaiwanPreviously unreported Linux implant deployed against Taiwanese appliances through an ELF dropper in ShareTech's add-on package directory. The dropper decrypts a staging script using a key derived from 'ShareTech' and executes the payload as 'udevds'. AVERAT polls its C2 over TCP port 25 every 600–699 seconds. It supports directory and process enumeration, resumable file transfers, recursive deletion, process termination, up to ten concurrent interactive shells, appliance rebooting, shared-object module loading, proxying or port forwarding, and runtime C2 and callback configuration changes.Read more ↗infosecurity magazine newsNews · Oct 5, 2026Linux Backdoors Target Telecoms, Masquerade as Email Traffic - Infosecurity MagazineLinux implant deployed against Taiwanese appliances, with six builds and an accompanying unnamed dropper reported. It disguises command-and-control traffic as outbound SMTP, checking in every 600–699 seconds. Supported commands include file transfers, process termination, up to ten concurrent shell sessions, and proxy or port-forwarding channels. Three builds connect to hardcoded addresses on compromised third-party devices in Taiwan that serve as relays. Attribution remains unresolved; no overlap with a named operational relay box network was identified.Read more ↗
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IOC matching13Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping26Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.