AVERAT
- Type
- RAT
- Capabilities
- ExfiltrationPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
- Platforms
- LinuxNetwork device
AVERAT is a modular Linux remote access Trojan observed on Taiwanese network-edge appliances, including mail-security appliances from ShareTech Information. It provides remote command execution, file transfer, host reconnaissance, and traffic proxying. Its capabilities include directory traversal, resumable file retrieval, chunked uploads, recursive deletion, process enumeration and termination, appliance reboot, and up to ten concurrent interactive shell sessions. Operators can extend its functionality by loading shared-object modules and modify command-and-control destinations, ports, and callback intervals at runtime.
AVERAT disguises command-and-control communications as outbound email traffic. It normally connects over TCP port 25, issues SMTP EHLO and STARTTLS commands, and then establishes its own encrypted session with shared-secret authentication. Its TLS implementation uses a fixed ClientHello template. Connection settings are stored in an encrypted configuration, and typical callbacks occur every 600–699 seconds. During check-in, the implant reports the hostname, current user, operating-system version, network interfaces, and logged-in users.
Observed deployments use an ELF installer after access to the appliance has already been established. The installation chain launches AVERAT and a watchdog component, then deletes the staged executables while their processes remain running, reducing file-based forensic evidence. AVERAT also supports proxy and port-forwarding channels through the compromised appliance. Some builds communicate through compromised Taiwanese consumer and small-business devices serving as relay infrastructure. No specific threat actor attribution has been established.
Techniques & procedures
26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
1 technique
Resource Development
The three IP addresses recovered from the configs represent compromised CPE belonging to third-party victims rather than intentional operator assets.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
An outbound relay terminating SMTP-disguised implant traffic, and an inbound routed VPN foothold into the host's own LAN.
Execution
2 techniques
Execution
912 Open an interactive shell session — up to ten concurrently.
1010 Load or unload a shared-object module, extending the implant.
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
An outbound relay terminating SMTP-disguised implant traffic, and an inbound routed VPN foothold into the host's own LAN.
Stealth
7 techniques
Stealth
Strings are hidden with a rotating substitution alphabet.
It carries four AES-128-ECB blobs keyed on the first sixteen bytes of SHA1("ShareTech").
The SpamSniper /var/run/spamsniper.pid mutex, together with the sample provenance, ties this build to the South Korean cluster.
VIMINIT="set viminfo=", HISTFILE=/dev/null, HISTSIZE=0, and HISTFILESIZE=0.
The script then copies two malicious binaries from /addpkg into /sbin as ntpdate and udevds, runs each, and unlinks them ten seconds later.
That key seeds RC4's key-scheduling algorithm, and the resulting S-box is used directly as a keystream.
The interval is stored in a hidden file at /var/lib/.db and can be changed by the operator, persisting across restarts.
Discovery
5 techniques
Discovery
Each reports hostname, current user, OS version, network interfaces, and logged-in users.
Each reports hostname, current user, OS version, network interfaces, and logged-in users.
629 Enumerate running processes with command lines.
Each reports hostname, current user, OS version, network interfaces, and logged-in users.
20 Enumerate directory contents; 30 Recursively walk a directory tree, resolving file ownership.
Collection
1 technique
Collection
T1005 Data from Local System Dropper
Command and Control
5 techniques
Command and Control
The schema provides three host and port pairs; this build populates one.
The implant connects outbound to port 25 and speaks SMTP: it issues EHLO, requests STARTTLS, and only then begins its own encrypted session.
1618 Open a proxy or port-forward channel through the appliance.
22 Upload a file to the host in chunks, appending on resume.
The command interface relies on the same cryptography (HMAC-SHA1, AES-CBC) and opcodes as the standard Tinyshell/Rekoobe.
Exfiltration
2 techniques
Exfiltration
22 Upload a file to the host in chunks, appending on resume.
21 Download a file from the host, with resume support.
Impact
2 techniques
Impact
632 Terminate a process (SIGTERM).
The reboot handler calls sync() before forcing a restart through the kernel rather than through init.
Observables
13 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.