XCPE is a firmware-preinstalled Android backdoor and modular botnet platform used primarily to compromise television set-top boxes. It has also affected digital signage, karaoke systems, and telehealth devices. Google Threat Intelligence Group attributed its intentional development, deployment, and operation to Chinese device manufacturer Videostrong Technology Co. with high confidence. The financially motivated operation sold access to criminal affiliates and enrolled more than 1.3 million devices worldwide.
The backdoor runs as a system application with Android system-level privileges. Its firmware-resident component restores the active application after reboot if it has been removed, making ordinary application uninstallation ineffective. Obfuscation and delayed malicious-code loading after initial device startup helped evade compatibility and security testing. XCPE can disable Google Play Protect verification and suppress installation prompts, allowing additional applications to be installed without user consent.
XCPE uses a multistage architecture comprising the primary backdoor, a loader, and affiliate modules. It retrieves initial configuration over HTTP and maintains command-and-control communications using MQTT. Operators can execute shell commands and scripts, open reverse shells, capture screenshots, inject keystrokes, discover local networks, and extract account information, device details, application inventories, and system logs. Affiliate modules primarily monetize infected devices through unauthorized residential proxy services and fraudulent advertising impressions and clicks; other modules steal credentials or deliver additional malware. Multiple modules can run concurrently under configurable resource limits and priorities.
Google, industry partners, and Japanese law enforcement disrupted XCPE command-and-control infrastructure in late October 2026. This action interrupted operator access but did not remove the firmware implant. Eliminating the infection requires clean firmware or replacement of the affected device.
4 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The backdoor, called x.cpe, was built into many device models and brands over several years.
Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG), working alongside industry partners and international law enforcement, has dismantled the XCPE botnet, which embedded factory-level backdoors across more than 1.3 million certified Android devices worldwide.
Google, alongside Japanese law enforcement and cyber security firms TrendAI, Human, and Synthient, has dismantled X.CPE, a global botnet embedded in the firmware of more than 1.3 million devices across over 200 countries.
The KM9PRO comes pre-installed with a backdoor running under the name “com.oemservice” (hereafter referred to as “x.cpe”).
6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
« Google a rompu ses liens avec Videostrong et pris des actions légales pour faire tomber les domaines et serveurs de contrôle du botnet »
« Le fabricant chinois Videostrong Technology Co. a délibérément intégré un malware backdoor dans ses box TV Android »
« S’activait dès le premier démarrage de l’appareil, contournant les contrôles de compatibilité Android »
« S’activait dès le premier démarrage de l’appareil, contournant les contrôles de compatibilité Android »
« Rendait l’adresse IP des victimes disponible à la revente via des services de proxy résidentiels »
« Permettait le téléchargement de modules malveillants supplémentaires pour des affiliés criminels »
« Rendait l’adresse IP des victimes disponible à la revente via des services de proxy résidentiels » ; « Conduisait de la fraude publicitaire »
298 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
87 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.