CerealLoader is a Windows .NET loader belonging to the Cereal cyberespionage toolset attributed with high confidence to the Russia-aligned Turla group. It decrypts .NET assemblies stored in encrypted files on disk and executes them, including CerealSprinter, which loads additional Cereal components. Unlike the toolset's other components, CerealLoader is normally stored on disk as a recognizable, unencrypted .NET file. Observed variants use RC4 or XOR to decrypt their payloads.
CerealLoader combines a native entry point with CLR VTable Fixups to invoke managed code through an unmanaged execution path, enabling execution inside processes that would not ordinarily initialize the .NET runtime. Operators have deployed it through DLL search-order hijacking involving Windows Management Instrumentation processes, with malicious libraries forwarding legitimate function calls to preserve normal operation. Other variants abuse the .NET native image cache by masquerading as Microsoft Exchange assemblies, executing malicious entry-point code while preserving execution of the legitimate library. These techniques conceal payload execution within legitimate Windows and Exchange processes.
CerealLoader was observed within Cereal deployments against government organizations in Kazakhstan and Romania compromised in late 2025. The broader toolset supports command execution, credential extraction, reconnaissance, and targeted email collection, but these functions are implemented by other components rather than CerealLoader itself. The initial access mechanism for these intrusions remains unknown.
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
CerealLoader: Decrypts and executes .NET assemblies from encrypted files on disk.
7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Turla develops its own malware.
Via search order hijacking, the application C:\Windows\system32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe loads the malicious DLL instead of the legitimate one.
All malicious .NET components described in this white paper were obfuscated with the ConfuserEx protector, using control flow obfuscation and string encryption.
Payloads contained in CerealRunner and CerealSprinter are XOR-encrypted.
Methods, arguments, attributes, classes, and namespaces were renamed to misleading terms, including names resembling legitimate Microsoft components.
CerealLoader, CerealNeuron, and CerealHermit can read an encrypted file from disk and decrypt it with XOR or RC4.
Via search order hijacking, the application C:\Windows\system32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe loads the malicious DLL instead of the legitimate one.
All Turla Cereal components in the toolset are reflectively loaded and executed, except for CerealLoader.
10 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
12 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.