CerealRunner is a .NET payload loader and command-execution component of the Cereal cyberespionage toolset, attributed with high confidence to the Russia-aligned Turla group. It has been observed in compromises of Microsoft Exchange servers at government organizations in Kazakhstan and Romania beginning in late 2025. Rather than implementing a fixed command set, CerealRunner carries individual tasks as encrypted, compiled .NET programs together with their execution arguments.
CerealRunner decrypts embedded assemblies, optionally decompresses them, and deserializes payloads and arguments for execution in memory. It returns serialized, compressed execution results to the calling component. In the CerealNeuron command channel, CerealRunner packages arrive through encrypted inbound web requests, and CerealNeuron encrypts and transmits their results to the operators. CerealRunner also participates in nested execution chains that deploy other Cereal components.
Observed task payloads retrieve Exchange mailboxes and individual messages, enumerate Active Directory objects, perform Windows Management Instrumentation queries, inspect processes and network connections, enumerate volume snapshots, and list, read, or delete local and network-accessible files. Other payloads extract Local Security Authority secrets, enabling credential theft. Encrypted packaging and in-memory execution reduce recognizable payload artifacts on disk. The initial access mechanism for the observed intrusions has not been established.
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
CerealRunner: Packages encrypted commands and payloads for in-memory execution and returns their output.
26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Turla develops its own malware.
Turla operators delivered an assembly to extract LSA secrets, including passwords for Active Domain accounts.
Turla operators delivered an assembly to extract LSA secrets, including passwords for local accounts.
Run WMI queries. For example, to list running processes, volume shadow copies, and all active TCP network connections.
Enumerate snapshots of a specified volume or share by calling the NtFsControlFile API with the FsControlCode parameter set to FSCTL_SRV_ENUMERATE_SNAPSHOTS.
Turla operators delivered an assembly to extract LSA secrets, including passwords for Active Domain accounts.
Turla operators delivered an assembly to extract LSA secrets, including passwords for local accounts.
Turla operators delivered an assembly to extract LSA secrets, including passwords for Active Domain accounts.
Turla operators delivered an assembly to extract LSA secrets, including passwords for local accounts.
All malicious .NET components described in this white paper were obfuscated with the ConfuserEx protector, using control flow obfuscation and string encryption.
CerealRunner and CerealSprinter contain embedded assemblies with commands or other malicious components to execute.
Payloads contained in CerealRunner and CerealSprinter are XOR-encrypted.
Methods, arguments, attributes, classes, and namespaces were renamed to misleading terms, including names resembling legitimate Microsoft components.
Delete a file. In most cases, the same files as in the previous item.
Turla operators delivered an assembly to extract LSA secrets, including passwords for Active Domain accounts.
Turla operators delivered an assembly to extract LSA secrets, including passwords for local accounts.
CerealLoader, CerealNeuron, and CerealHermit can read an encrypted file from disk and decrypt it with XOR or RC4.
All Turla Cereal components in the toolset are reflectively loaded and executed, except for CerealLoader.
Obtain LSA Secrets stored in the registry, for a remote or local host.
Query Active Directory with Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) to retrieve information about computers, users, groups, DNS records, organizational units, and more.
Turla operators delivered an assembly to get all processes running on the system.
Turla operators delivered an assembly to query Active Directory to get information about groups.
List files for a given path, usually network paths.
Turla operators delivered an assembly to query Active Directory to get information about user accounts.
Turla operators delivered assemblies to get listings of files for network shares.
Read the contents of a file, given its path. In most cases the operators specified files with email messages filtered by the CerealBox component.
Turla operators delivered assemblies to get listings of files for network shared drives.
Prior to exfiltration, CerealBox writes interesting emails to disk.
Get a mailbox from a specified Exchange server in the network and retrieve all messages.
The dictionary is serialized, gzip compressed, XOR-encrypted, and saved to a file on disk.
CerealNeuron uses HTTP or HTTPS for communication.
CerealNeuron uses the same channel that receives commands to send exfiltrated information.
8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.