CerealBox is a .NET email-collection spyware component of the Cereal cyberespionage toolset used by Turla, a Russia-linked threat group associated with the Federal Security Service. It targets Microsoft Exchange servers on Windows and has been deployed against government organizations in Kazakhstan and Romania. The Romanian deployment selectively targeted correspondence involving NATO and European Union institutions; this does not establish compromise of those institutions’ infrastructure.
CerealBox is injected into Exchange’s mail-transport process and intercepts messages by wrapping the handlers of transport agents already loaded in memory. It executes its collection logic before returning control to the original handlers, preserving normal email delivery. Because it does not register a new transport agent, its presence is not reflected in the Exchange transport-agent configuration.
Collection is selective: messages must contain Word or PDF attachments and match hardcoded sender, recipient, subject, or attachment-name criteria while avoiding exclusion lists. CerealBox compresses and encrypts selected messages and stages them on disk. Other Cereal components subsequently retrieve and delete the staged data, separating email interception from exfiltration. Its in-memory interception and selective collection support covert intelligence gathering on already compromised servers. The initial access mechanism used in the observed intrusions has not been established.
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
CerealBox uses a stealthier approach. Instead of registering itself, it is injected directly into EdgeTransport.exe, the Exchange process that handles email flow.
9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Turla develops its own malware.
CerealIron is used to inject CerealBox into a process specified by the operators.
All malicious .NET components described in this white paper were obfuscated with the ConfuserEx protector, using control flow obfuscation and string encryption.
Payloads contained in CerealRunner and CerealSprinter are XOR-encrypted.
Methods, arguments, attributes, classes, and namespaces were renamed to misleading terms, including names resembling legitimate Microsoft components.
CerealIron is used to inject CerealBox into a process specified by the operators.
Read the contents of a file, given its path. In most cases the operators specified files with email messages filtered by the CerealBox component.
Prior to exfiltration, CerealBox writes interesting emails to disk.
CerealBox automatically filters incoming and outgoing email messages and writes interesting ones to disk.
The dictionary is serialized, gzip compressed, XOR-encrypted, and saved to a file on disk.
12 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.