CerealNeuron is a .NET-based passive HTTP(S) backdoor for Windows systems running Microsoft Exchange Server. It is the main network-accessible backdoor in the modular Cereal cyberespionage toolset, attributed with high confidence to the Russia-aligned Turla group. Cereal deployments were identified at government organizations in Kazakhstan and Romania, with compromises dating to late 2025.
Rather than beaconing to an external command server, CerealNeuron uses Microsoft's HttpListener class to receive operator requests through the compromised Exchange server. Its registered URL prefixes resemble legitimate Exchange services, including Outlook Web Access, Autodiscover, and ActiveSync. HTTP.sys routes matching requests directly to the implant rather than IIS, so malicious requests may be absent from IIS logs. Command traffic uses RSA-2048 and AES encryption with cryptographic integrity verification; invalid requests are redirected to legitimate-looking Exchange error pages.
CerealNeuron has no built-in command set. It executes supplied .NET assemblies, typically packaged in CerealRunner binaries, and encrypts and returns their output. Observed task payloads retrieve Exchange mailboxes and individual messages, enumerate Active Directory, perform Windows Management Instrumentation reconnaissance, extract LSA Secrets, and read or delete files. The backdoor also provides a channel for retrieving email staged by the separate CerealBox collection component. This modular architecture enables post-compromise command execution and data exfiltration without conventional outbound command-and-control beaconing. The initial compromise mechanism has not been established.
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
CerealNeuron: Passive HTTP(S) backdoor that receives and executes commands through the compromised Exchange server.
27 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Turla develops its own malware.
Turla operators delivered an assembly to extract LSA secrets, including passwords for Active Domain accounts.
Turla operators delivered an assembly to extract LSA secrets, including passwords for local accounts.
Run WMI queries. For example, to list running processes, volume shadow copies, and all active TCP network connections.
Enumerate snapshots of a specified volume or share by calling the NtFsControlFile API with the FsControlCode parameter set to FSCTL_SRV_ENUMERATE_SNAPSHOTS.
Turla operators delivered an assembly to extract LSA secrets, including passwords for Active Domain accounts.
Turla operators delivered an assembly to extract LSA secrets, including passwords for local accounts.
Turla operators delivered an assembly to extract LSA secrets, including passwords for Active Domain accounts.
Turla operators delivered an assembly to extract LSA secrets, including passwords for local accounts.
All malicious .NET components described in this white paper were obfuscated with the ConfuserEx protector, using control flow obfuscation and string encryption.
Payloads contained in CerealRunner and CerealSprinter are XOR-encrypted.
Methods, arguments, attributes, classes, and namespaces were renamed to misleading terms, including names resembling legitimate Microsoft components.
Delete a file. In most cases, the same files as in the previous item.
Turla operators delivered an assembly to extract LSA secrets, including passwords for Active Domain accounts.
Turla operators delivered an assembly to extract LSA secrets, including passwords for local accounts.
CerealLoader, CerealNeuron, and CerealHermit can read an encrypted file from disk and decrypt it with XOR or RC4.
All Turla Cereal components in the toolset are reflectively loaded and executed, except for CerealLoader.
Obtain LSA Secrets stored in the registry, for a remote or local host.
Query Active Directory with Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) to retrieve information about computers, users, groups, DNS records, organizational units, and more.
Turla operators delivered an assembly to get all processes running on the system.
Turla operators delivered an assembly to query Active Directory to get information about groups.
List files for a given path, usually network paths.
Turla operators delivered an assembly to query Active Directory to get information about user accounts.
Turla operators delivered assemblies to get listings of files for network shares.
Read the contents of a file, given its path. In most cases the operators specified files with email messages filtered by the CerealBox component.
Turla operators delivered assemblies to get listings of files for network shared drives.
Prior to exfiltration, CerealBox writes interesting emails to disk.
Get a mailbox from a specified Exchange server in the network and retrieve all messages.
CerealNeuron uses HTTP or HTTPS for communication.
A valid request body contains base64-encoded bytes.
CerealNeuron uses AES for encryption of information contained in network packets.
The first 256 bytes are decrypted with RSA-2048, and contain bytes needed to calculate an AES key and IV.
CerealNeuron uses the same channel that receives commands to send exfiltrated information.
12 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.