Cereal is a modular .NET cyberespionage toolset used by Turla, a Russian state-linked threat group associated with the Federal Security Service, to maintain long-term access to compromised Microsoft Exchange servers. Identified at government organizations in Kazakhstan and Romania in late 2025, it supports remote command execution, selective email collection, credential extraction, organizational reconnaissance, and file management. The Romanian deployment targeted correspondence involving NATO and European Union institutions. The initial compromise mechanism has not been established.
Cereal uses encrypted, task-specific .NET assemblies that are unpacked and executed largely in memory. Its CerealNeuron component is a passive backdoor that accepts encrypted HTTP(S) requests through the compromised Exchange server rather than periodically contacting an external command server. Requests resemble legitimate Exchange service traffic and undergo cryptographic validation before execution; invalid requests receive legitimate-looking Exchange error responses. CerealRunner carries executable tasks and returns their output for encrypted transmission. CerealHermit provides a separate, non-networked command channel using encrypted files. No dedicated external command-and-control infrastructure was identified in the observed intrusions.
The CerealBox email-collection component modifies existing Exchange transport-agent handlers in memory without registering a new transport agent. It preserves normal message delivery while selecting messages with Word or PDF attachments that also match configured sender, recipient, subject, or attachment-name criteria. Selected messages are compressed, encrypted, and staged locally for subsequent retrieval and deletion. Other tasks retrieve mailboxes and individual messages through Exchange Web Services, enumerate Active Directory objects, query processes and network connections through Windows Management Instrumentation, extract Local Security Authority secrets, and read or delete files.
Cereal's loading and execution components use process injection, DLL search-order hijacking, .NET native image cache abuse, and native entry points with VTable Fixups to conceal execution within legitimate Windows processes. Encrypted payloads, obfuscation, in-memory execution, and Antimalware Scan Interface bypass techniques further reduce its visible footprint.
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Dubbed the Cereal toolset, the malware abuses legitimate Microsoft Exchange and Windows functionality to support long-term access, execute encrypted .NET assemblies in memory, and collect sensitive communications while minimizing forensic artifacts.
3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
47 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.