CerealIron is a Windows process-injection loader in the modular Cereal cyberespionage toolset associated with the Russia-aligned Turla threat group. It enables operators to load and execute .NET assemblies inside unmanaged processes that would not ordinarily host managed code. CerealIron manually maps an architecture-matched 32-bit or 64-bit bootstrapper into a target process, resolves imports and relocations, and uses CreateRemoteThread to initiate Common Language Runtime loading and managed payload execution. Only 32-bit CerealIron samples have been observed.
CerealIron was used in Cereal deployment chains targeting Microsoft Exchange environments at governmental organizations in Kazakhstan and Romania in late 2025. In an observed chain, CerealRunner, CerealMoth, CerealIron, and CerealSprinter delivered CerealBox, an email-interception component that manipulates existing Exchange transport agents in memory. The injection target was supplied as a process identifier and was not directly confirmed. CerealIron's embedded bootstrapper components had previously been publicly linked to Turla, providing a principal basis for attributing the wider toolset to that group. The initial access mechanism for these compromises remains unknown.
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Turla develops its own malware.
CerealIron is used to inject CerealBox into a process specified by the operators.
All malicious .NET components described in this white paper were obfuscated with the ConfuserEx protector, using control flow obfuscation and string encryption.
CerealRunner and CerealSprinter contain embedded assemblies with commands or other malicious components to execute.
Methods, arguments, attributes, classes, and namespaces were renamed to misleading terms, including names resembling legitimate Microsoft components.
CerealIron is used to inject CerealBox into a process specified by the operators.
All Turla Cereal components in the toolset are reflectively loaded and executed, except for CerealLoader.
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.