CerealMoth is a .NET assembly-loading component of the Cereal cyberespionage toolset, attributed with high confidence to the Russia-aligned Turla threat group. It accepts an assembly and a method name as arguments, loads the assembly, and invokes the specified method. Its role is payload execution rather than independent command-and-control or intelligence collection.
CerealMoth has appeared in a multistage deployment chain alongside CerealRunner, CerealIron, and CerealSprinter to deliver CerealBox, an email-collection component targeting Microsoft Exchange. The Cereal toolset was observed on Windows-based Exchange servers at government organizations in Kazakhstan and Romania beginning in late 2025. The initial access mechanism for these compromises remains unknown.
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Turla develops its own malware.
All malicious .NET components described in this white paper were obfuscated with the ConfuserEx protector, using control flow obfuscation and string encryption.
Methods, arguments, attributes, classes, and namespaces were renamed to misleading terms, including names resembling legitimate Microsoft components.
All Turla Cereal components in the toolset are reflectively loaded and executed, except for CerealLoader.
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.