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Mallory
Malware

wfx-loot

Tracked since Nov 12, 2026 · Updated 1 day ago
Trending this week#45of 30,236 malware families
Mention activity · 30 days7 mentions · peak 5 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK12Techniques
IOCs11Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistencePrivilege escalationLateral movementDefense evasion
Platforms
Cloud

wfx-loot is a shell-based information stealer targeting GitHub Actions environments and connected cloud services. First detected in November 2026, it was deployed through compromised GitHub accounts by modifying existing workflows, creating temporary workflows, or attaching execution to package installation hooks. The campaign affected thousands of repositories, including repositories accessible through collaborator and organization permissions. Automated publishing also propagated malicious content into software packages, although affected Go module releases contained malicious workflow files that do not execute during ordinary Go builds.

The payload collects CI secrets, environment variables, cloud credentials, SSH and GPG keys, developer-service tokens, AI-service credentials, and other sensitive local files. It abuses OIDC tokens and stolen credentials to access AWS, Google Cloud, and Azure, attempts privilege escalation through role chaining and service-account impersonation, and accesses services including Vault and Kubernetes. Persistence mechanisms include creating long-lived AWS access keys, weakening AWS role trust policies, and adding Azure federated identity credentials. These cloud identity changes can preserve attacker access after existing secrets are rotated.

wfx-loot exfiltrates stolen information through HTTP requests and alternative channels including GitHub caches, workflow summaries, artifacts, Telegram, and encrypted commits. It forges passing status checks to bypass branch protection and removes malicious changes, payloads, workflow runs, and logs to conceal execution. Its operators have not been conclusively identified; overlap with accounts compromised by GhostActions does not establish common operation.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

L’acteur malveillant a exploité 4 837 comptes GitHub compromis pour ouvrir des pull requests de sondage dans 61 764 dépôts

T1195.001Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsEvidence1

T1195.001 — Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools (Initial Access)

Execution

1 technique
T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

Le script shell de ~1 500 lignes opère en quatre phases

Persistence

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

L’acteur malveillant a exploité 4 837 comptes GitHub compromis pour ouvrir des pull requests de sondage dans 61 764 dépôts

T1098.001Additional Cloud CredentialsEvidence1

injection de federated identity credentials Azure AD nommées wfx-ci-…

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

L’acteur malveillant a exploité 4 837 comptes GitHub compromis pour ouvrir des pull requests de sondage dans 61 764 dépôts

T1098.001Additional Cloud CredentialsEvidence1

injection de federated identity credentials Azure AD nommées wfx-ci-…

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

Escalate : échange OIDC vers AWS/GCP/Azure, chaînage de rôles IAM, impersonation de comptes de service GCP, pivot Azure via tokens FOCI, replay contre HashiCorp Vault et Kubernetes

Stealth

2 techniques
T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

Le payload est supprimé dans la minute suivant l’exécution, avec effacement des logs de run.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

L’acteur malveillant a exploité 4 837 comptes GitHub compromis pour ouvrir des pull requests de sondage dans 61 764 dépôts

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

Collect : secrets GitHub Actions, tokens OIDC, variables d’environnement

T1552.001Credentials In FilesEvidence1

fichiers de credentials (AWS, Azure, GCP, Docker, Kubernetes, npm, PyPI, SSH, GPG, Vault, Terraform)

T1552.004Private KeysEvidence1

T1552.004 — Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys (Credential Access)

Collection

1 technique
T1530Data from Cloud StorageEvidence1

T1530 — Data from Cloud Storage (Collection)

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Exfiltrate : HTTP POST vers deux serveurs C2

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

avec canaux alternatifs (Actions Cache API, step summary, artifact upload, Telegram Bot, commit chiffré AES)

Indicators of compromise

Observables

11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
cyberveilleNews · Nov 15, 2026Campagne wfx-loot : vol de secrets CI/CD via 4 800 comptes GitHub compromis | CyberVeilleApproximately 1,500-line shell-based stealer deployed through compromised GitHub accounts using workflow injections, package postinstall hooks, and temporary workflow branches. Collects CI/CD secrets, OIDC tokens, cloud and AI-service credentials, private keys, and configuration files. Attempts cloud privilege escalation and persistence through IAM trust-policy changes, Azure federated credentials, and branch-protection bypasses. Exfiltrates data through HTTP POST and alternative channels, then deletes its payload and execution logs. The campaign used 4,837 compromised accounts to probe 61,764 repositories; 1,835 repositories executed the payload with confirmed exfiltration.Read more ↗resilient cyber blogNews · Nov 12, 2026Resilient Brief #122: OpenAI's Eval Breach and Dense VulnsApproximately 1,500-line CI secret-stealing script distributed through compromised GitHub accounts. It steals GitHub Actions secrets and cloud and AI provider credentials, mints OIDC tokens for AWS, GCP and Azure, forges required status checks to bypass branch protection, and modifies AWS role trust policies to permit access from any account. It deletes workflow runs and logs to conceal execution. More than 1,800 repositories reportedly ran the payload.Read more ↗help net securityNews · Nov 12, 2026Check your GitHub repos: A secret stealer hit tens of thousands of them - Help Net SecurityAn approximately 1,500-line shell payload deployed using stolen GitHub credentials through modified workflows, npm install hooks, or new workflows on temporary branches. It steals GitHub Actions secrets, cloud and SSH credentials, shell histories, and AI-tool tokens, exfiltrating data over HTTP to two attacker servers. It uses stolen credentials to access AWS, GCP, and Azure; creates long-lived AWS access keys; weakens AWS role trust policies; and adds Azure federated identity credentials that can preserve access after secret rotation. The attacker rapidly reverts malicious changes and deletes workflow runs and logs. Automated publishing also propagated the payload into a Packagist package and workflow files in two Go module releases. The report identifies more than 1,800 repositories where the payload executed and exfiltrated credentials.Read more ↗
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IOC matching11Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping12Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.