GitDoor
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- Credential theftSession hijackingKeyloggingExfiltrationPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceDLL sideloadingProcess injection
- Platforms
- Windows
GitDoor is a modular Windows backdoor used in Operation ShadowCloud, an espionage campaign identified in early 2026 that primarily targeted government organizations in Asia and Africa. It is related to GraphDoor but uses GitHub rather than Microsoft SharePoint as its principal command-and-control channel. GitDoor retrieves commands and plug-ins from a public GitHub repository and uploads victim information and execution results to a separate private repository using a personal access token. It also supports communications and traffic proxying through Ably.
GitDoor collects host, user, operating-system, process, and network information and assigns identifiers to distinguish compromised systems. Its command protocol uses AES encryption, XOR transformations, and Base64 encoding. Control-flow flattening, layered indirect calls, encrypted plug-ins, and in-memory payload execution complicate analysis and detection. Its command set supports file management and transfers, keylogging, screenshots, process enumeration, proxy control, and execution of shellcode, executable payloads, and COFF modules. Proxy functionality includes a modified Erfrp client and an Ably-based component.
Downloadable modules extend GitDoor with process injection, command execution, an interactive reverse shell, process-memory dumping, and management of Windows services, scheduled tasks, registry values, firewall rules, users, and groups. Credential-access modules use Mimikatz-derived functionality to extract credentials and password hashes, CookieKatz to extract browser cookies from process memory, and additional tooling to recover WhatsApp database decryption keys. Injection techniques include remote-thread creation, thread-context hijacking, asynchronous procedure calls, and KernelCallbackTable manipulation.
Observed deployments abused MeshCentral Agent to deliver legitimate executables, malicious sideloaded DLLs, and encrypted backdoor payloads, which loaders decrypted and executed in memory. The original intrusion vector remains unknown. Operation ShadowCloud has not been definitively attributed to a specific threat actor; closely timed deployment and shared staging locations with FamousSparrow- and CopperTurtle-associated tooling do not establish common ownership.
Observables
9 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
14 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.