Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware

FabricShadow

Tracked since Nov 19, 2026 · Updated today
Trending this week#46of 30,713 malware families
Mention activity · 30 days6 mentions · peak 3 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK8Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
ReconnaissanceExfiltrationPost exploitation
Platforms
Linux

FabricShadow is a malicious Java reconnaissance and exfiltration component used in the BankWeaver campaign against Temenos Quantum Fabric digital banking middleware. It executes through the platform’s DataPreProcessor2 hook before application data requests are processed, operating within the legitimate application’s execution environment. It collects hostnames, network interface addresses, environment variable names, Java runtime details, operating-system information, service-account identity, process information, and directory listings. Collected information is saved locally and transmitted to remote infrastructure using HTTP POST requests. An observed exfiltration destination was a webshell on another victim’s Red Hat Process Automation Manager deployment.

Attackers installed FabricShadow by abusing Quantum Fabric’s legitimate custom Java integration and service-deployment functionality after obtaining administrative access. The intrusion exploited an anonymously accessible authentication service whose application tokens could be exchanged for administrative privileges without valid credentials. FabricShadow was deployed alongside FabricShell, a separate component providing command execution and database-query capabilities. The campaign was confirmed at one financial services institution; six additional banks were identified with similar exposure, but their compromise was not confirmed. Correcting the authentication-service exposure does not remove an already installed implant.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

FabricShadow enumerated network interface addresses as part of its automated reconnaissance routine.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

FabricShadow collected the service account name and executed the id command. This exposed the local user and group context available to the malicious component.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

FabricShadow automatically collected the hostname, operating system name and architecture, Java version, Java home, working directory, service account, and Java process identifier.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

FabricShadow listed /tmp and the current working directory. Interactive operator activity also included commands such as ls and pwd .

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

FabricShell facilitated collection of content from the root and home filesystems, along with host and runtime information gathered by FabricShadow.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

FabricShell received commands and returned execution results through a web service. FabricShadow generated outbound HTTP POST requests containing collected host information.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

After installing the service, the actors validated its execution using ls and pwd , spawned a reverse shell via netcat , and downloaded shell scripts from free hosting services such as sendit.sh , plainraw.sh and temp.sh .

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

FabricShadow transmitted reconnaissance results through outbound POST requests.

Activity feed

Recent activity

6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
cyber security newsNews · Nov 20, 2026Hackers Exploit Misconfigured Temenos Banking Platform to Deploy Web Shells Without PasswordsMalicious Java reconnaissance component identified in the BankWeaver compromise of a financial services institution's Temenos Quantum Fabric deployment. It executes before application data requests are processed, gathers server and execution-environment details, stores the results locally, and exfiltrates them to remote infrastructure.Read more ↗cryptika blogNews · Nov 20, 2026Hackers Exploit Misconfigured Temenos Banking Platform to Deploy Web Shells Without Passwords | Cryptika CybersecurityMalicious Java reconnaissance component deployed in the BankWeaver campaign against Temenos Quantum Fabric. It executed before application data requests were processed, gathered server and runtime information, saved the results locally, and exfiltrated them to remote infrastructure.Read more ↗forescoutNews · Nov 19, 2026BankWeaver Campaign Abuses Digital Banking Middleware to Deploy Web Shells - ForescoutMalicious Java JAR deployed during the BankWeaver campaign that uses Kony’s DataPreProcessor2 hook to execute before data requests are processed. Automatically collects host and network information, environment variable names, Java runtime details, service-account context, process identifiers, id command output, and directory listings. Sends collected information to a hardcoded C2 endpoint through HTTP POST requests using the X-A: k1 header and distinctive RECON_* markers, while retaining a local copy under /tmp. Its C2 endpoint was a webshell on another victim’s server used to stage exfiltrated data.Read more ↗
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matchingMatch every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping8Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.