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Malware

FabricShell

Tracked since Nov 19, 2026 · Updated today
Trending this week#45of 30,713 malware families
Mention activity · 30 days6 mentions · peak 3 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK9Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Webshell
Capabilities
Post exploitation
Platforms
Linux

FabricShell is a Java-based webshell used in the BankWeaver campaign against Temenos Quantum Fabric, formerly Kony Fabric, in the financial services sector. It is deployed as a malicious JAR and registered as a Fabric service through Kony’s JavaService2 interface. Running within the middleware’s normal service framework gives it the application’s process identity, network access, and database connectivity.

FabricShell accepts request parameters specifying operating-system commands or database operations. It executes supplied commands through a Unix shell and returns their output and exit status. Its database functionality uses JDBC to execute SQL and return up to 50 rows. Embedded fallback PostgreSQL credentials and connection details linked to another victim supported database access, including data-modification operations. These capabilities do not establish that customer records were stolen.

BankWeaver operators installed FabricShell after abusing an internet-facing Fabric authentication service configured to permit anonymous access. Tokens intended for anonymous application users were accepted across an administrative trust boundary, allowing the operators to obtain administrative access without valid credentials and deploy malicious Java integrations. FabricShell was installed alongside FabricShadow, a separate reconnaissance and exfiltration component. Investigators confirmed one financial institution compromise; six additional banks had apparently similar exposure, but their compromise was not confirmed. Restricting the exposed authentication route does not remove an already-installed implant.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

FabricShell passed attacker-controlled command strings to /bin/sh -c . Observed commands included initial tests such as ls and pwd , followed by shell scripts and reverse shell activity.

Persistence

1 technique
T1505.003Web ShellEvidence1

FabricShell was registered as a middleware service. It accepted attacker-controlled commands, captured output and errors, and returned the results through HTTP responses.

Stealth

1 technique
T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

Threat actor performed cleanup activity following payload retrieval, command execution, and collection via FabricShell.

Discovery

1 technique
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

FabricShadow listed /tmp and the current working directory. Interactive operator activity also included commands such as ls and pwd .

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

FabricShell facilitated collection of content from the root and home filesystems, along with host and runtime information gathered by FabricShadow.

T1213.006DatabasesEvidence1

FabricShell accepted database connection and SQL parameters, opened a JDBC connection, executed attacker queries, and returned their results. The recovered component also contained hardcoded PostgreSQL connection information.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

FabricShell received commands and returned execution results through a web service. FabricShadow generated outbound HTTP POST requests containing collected host information.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

After installing the service, the actors validated its execution using ls and pwd , spawned a reverse shell via netcat , and downloaded shell scripts from free hosting services such as sendit.sh , plainraw.sh and temp.sh .

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence1

The application server communicates with the C2 via webshell uploaded using FabricShell on nonstandard ports.

Activity feed

Recent activity

6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
cyber security newsNews · Nov 20, 2026Hackers Exploit Misconfigured Temenos Banking Platform to Deploy Web Shells Without PasswordsMalicious Java component deployed during the BankWeaver campaign against a misconfigured Temenos Quantum Fabric deployment. Attackers obtained administrator privileges through anonymous authentication and abused custom Java integrations to install it. FabricShell provides operating system command execution and database querying through the platform. Investigators found hardcoded PostgreSQL connection details tied to another victim, but did not establish that customer records were stolen.Read more ↗cryptika blogNews · Nov 20, 2026Hackers Exploit Misconfigured Temenos Banking Platform to Deploy Web Shells Without Passwords | Cryptika CybersecurityMalicious Java component deployed through Temenos Quantum Fabric’s custom integration functionality during the BankWeaver campaign. Attackers exploited anonymous access misconfiguration to obtain administrator privileges and register the implant as a service. FabricShell enabled operating system command execution and database queries. Investigators found hardcoded PostgreSQL connection details tied to another victim, but the report does not establish that customer records were stolen.Read more ↗forescoutNews · Nov 19, 2026BankWeaver Campaign Abuses Digital Banking Middleware to Deploy Web Shells - ForescoutMalicious Java JAR deployed as a Temenos Fabric service during the BankWeaver campaign after attackers obtained administrative access through an anonymously accessible authentication service. Executes attacker-supplied commands through /bin/sh -c and returns output and exit codes. It also executes SQL queries through JDBC and returns up to 50 rows. Hardcoded fallback PostgreSQL credentials reference another victim. Observed activity included reverse shells, filesystem data collection, exfiltration, and cleanup.Read more ↗
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Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping9Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.