FabricShell
- Type
- Webshell
- Capabilities
- Post exploitation
- Platforms
- Linux
FabricShell is a Java-based webshell used in the BankWeaver campaign against Temenos Quantum Fabric, formerly Kony Fabric, in the financial services sector. It is deployed as a malicious JAR and registered as a Fabric service through Kony’s JavaService2 interface. Running within the middleware’s normal service framework gives it the application’s process identity, network access, and database connectivity.
FabricShell accepts request parameters specifying operating-system commands or database operations. It executes supplied commands through a Unix shell and returns their output and exit status. Its database functionality uses JDBC to execute SQL and return up to 50 rows. Embedded fallback PostgreSQL credentials and connection details linked to another victim supported database access, including data-modification operations. These capabilities do not establish that customer records were stolen.
BankWeaver operators installed FabricShell after abusing an internet-facing Fabric authentication service configured to permit anonymous access. Tokens intended for anonymous application users were accepted across an administrative trust boundary, allowing the operators to obtain administrative access without valid credentials and deploy malicious Java integrations. FabricShell was installed alongside FabricShadow, a separate reconnaissance and exfiltration component. Investigators confirmed one financial institution compromise; six additional banks had apparently similar exposure, but their compromise was not confirmed. Restricting the exposed authentication route does not remove an already-installed implant.
Techniques & procedures
9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Execution
1 technique
Execution
FabricShell passed attacker-controlled command strings to /bin/sh -c . Observed commands included initial tests such as ls and pwd , followed by shell scripts and reverse shell activity.
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
FabricShell was registered as a middleware service. It accepted attacker-controlled commands, captured output and errors, and returned the results through HTTP responses.
Stealth
1 technique
Stealth
Threat actor performed cleanup activity following payload retrieval, command execution, and collection via FabricShell.
Discovery
1 technique
Discovery
FabricShadow listed /tmp and the current working directory. Interactive operator activity also included commands such as ls and pwd .
Collection
2 techniques
Collection
FabricShell facilitated collection of content from the root and home filesystems, along with host and runtime information gathered by FabricShadow.
FabricShell accepted database connection and SQL parameters, opened a JDBC connection, executed attacker queries, and returned their results. The recovered component also contained hardcoded PostgreSQL connection information.
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
FabricShell received commands and returned execution results through a web service. FabricShadow generated outbound HTTP POST requests containing collected host information.
After installing the service, the actors validated its execution using ls and pwd , spawned a reverse shell via netcat , and downloaded shell scripts from free hosting services such as sendit.sh , plainraw.sh and temp.sh .
The application server communicates with the C2 via webshell uploaded using FabricShell on nonstandard ports.
Recent activity
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.