A critical remote code execution vulnerability, dubbed React2Shell, was discovered in the React 19 library, specifically affecting React Server Components. The flaw allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code on servers by sending crafted requests, making it a severe risk for organizations using default React and Next.js deployments. Within hours of public disclosure, security firms including Google’s Threat Intelligence Group and AWS confirmed active exploitation in the wild, highlighting the shrinking window between vulnerability awareness and real-world attacks. Researchers from Wiz and Unit 42 demonstrated that even clean, default deployments were susceptible, emphasizing the widespread impact due to the popularity of these frameworks.
Threat actors rapidly weaponized the React2Shell vulnerability, with the RondoDoX botnet launching automated exploitation campaigns targeting both web applications and IoT devices. CloudSEK’s analysis of command and control logs revealed a multi-month campaign, with a significant spike in attacks following the vulnerability’s disclosure in December 2025. The RondoDoX botnet deployed various payloads, including web shells and cryptominers, and quickly adapted its infrastructure in response to security firm reports. Organizations with technology stacks overlapping the targeted vectors were promptly alerted, underscoring the urgent need for patching and monitoring in environments using React 19 and Next.js.

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12 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
By December 31, 2025, reporting noted that CISA had added CVE-2025-55182 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. The listing underscored that the flaw was actively exploited and required urgent remediation.
Reporting in late December 2025 linked both criminal and state-aligned actors to React2Shell exploitation, including China-linked groups Earth Lumia and Jackpot Panda and North Korean operators. The flaw was described as being used for both initial access and persistent compromise.
By late December 2025, researchers and internet scanning data reported tens of thousands of exposed vulnerable systems, with estimates ranging from about 77,000 in early December to more than 90,000 by the end of the month. Most exposed instances were reported in the United States.
Multiple vendors and researchers, including Google, AWS, Wiz, Unit 42, and Huntress, confirmed that React2Shell was exploited in the wild within hours of public disclosure. They also documented post-exploitation activity such as backdoors, tunneling tools, and cryptomining kits.
React maintainers and downstream frameworks released patches for React2Shell and urged organizations to update immediately. Security guidance emphasized that patching should be paired with threat hunting because compromise could have already occurred.
A critical unauthenticated remote code execution flaw in React 19 Server Components, tracked as CVE-2025-55182 and dubbed React2Shell, was publicly disclosed in December 2025. The bug affected default React and Next.js deployments and was rated CVSS 10.0.
After Darktrace's December 10 reporting, RondoDox operators changed infrastructure, and CloudSEK observed new active command-and-control servers three days later. This indicated rapid adaptation to public scrutiny while continuing exploitation.
CloudSEK observed exploitation of the Next.js/React Server Components flaw becoming the dominant RondoDox vector from December 13, 2025 onward. The botnet repeatedly delivered payloads including coinminers, Mirai-related binaries, and persistence tooling.
CloudSEK said Darktrace publicly reported exploitation of React2Shell on December 10, 2025. This was an early public indication that attackers were already abusing the flaw in the wild.
By late 2025, the campaign had progressed from reconnaissance and web exploitation into hourly automated attacks that deployed botnet malware to IoT devices. Reports describe this as a distinct operational phase focused on scale, persistence, and propagation.
BleepingComputer said Fortinet first identified RondoDox in July 2025. By that point, the botnet had already been evolving its operations against exposed infrastructure.
CloudSEK reported that the RondoDox botnet campaign started in March 2025 with reconnaissance and manual vulnerability testing against web applications and internet-exposed devices. This marked the first phase of a broader automated operation that later expanded to web servers and IoT targets.
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