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ConsentFix v3 Automates Azure Account Hijacking via OAuth Code Theft

Vulnerability Disclosure · 2 sources · Updated 5mo ago · First seen May 2, 2026

ConsentFix v3 Automates Azure Account Hijacking via OAuth Code Theft

Researchers reported a new phishing technique, ConsentFix v3, that targets Microsoft Azure accounts by abusing the OAuth2 authorization code flow and trusted first-party Microsoft applications. The attack sends victims through a legitimate Microsoft sign-in process, then tricks them into pasting or dragging a localhost redirect URL containing an authorization code back into a phishing page. Attackers can then exchange that code for tokens, enabling access to Microsoft resources such as email and files without needing the victim’s password and even when MFA is enabled.

The latest variant expands on earlier ConsentFix methods by adding automation and scale through third-party services including Cloudflare Pages for phishing infrastructure and Pipedream for capturing authorization codes, exchanging them for refresh tokens, and collecting stolen tokens; reports also noted use of platforms such as DocSend. The technique also incorporates tenant enumeration and employee impersonation to improve targeting. Defenders were advised that mitigation is challenging because trust in Microsoft first-party apps is built into the architecture, but measures such as token binding, behavioral detections, and restricting app authentication can reduce exposure. Researchers said ConsentFix-style attacks have appeared in real campaigns, although widespread adoption of the v3 variant has not yet been confirmed.

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Event timeline

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3 events · May 2, 2026
  1. May 2, 20267mo ago

    Researchers note ConsentFix-style attacks have appeared in real campaigns

    Reporting on ConsentFix v3 stated that ConsentFix-style attacks have been observed in real-world campaigns, although it remained unclear whether the specific v3 variant had been widely adopted by cybercriminals. The disclosure also highlighted mitigations including token binding, behavioral detections, and app authentication restrictions.

  2. May 2, 20267mo ago

    Push Security discloses ConsentFix v3 Azure OAuth phishing technique

    Push Security reported a new ConsentFix v3 attack that targets Microsoft Azure by abusing the OAuth2 authorization code flow and trusted first-party Microsoft applications. The variant adds automation and scalability through services such as Pipedream, Cloudflare Pages, and DocSend, enabling token theft without passwords and despite MFA.

  3. Date unknown

    Earlier ConsentFix variants are documented by researchers

    Prior versions of the ConsentFix phishing technique were described by Push Security and John Hammond before the newer v3 variant emerged. These earlier variants established the OAuth abuse pattern that ConsentFix v3 later expanded on.

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Microsoft Corporation
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