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A supply-chain attack on the Rust ecosystem used a malicious typosquatted crate, rustdecimal, published on crates.io to target cloud-based development pipelines. SentinelLabs found 15 malicious versions, from 1.22.0 through 1.23.5, indicating repeated refinement by the attacker. The package checked for the GITLAB_CI environment variable and, when present, downloaded and executed a second-stage payload, turning compromised CI jobs into an entry point for broader downstream compromise.
The second-stage malware was identified as the Mythic Poseidon agent written in Go, with Linux and macOS support and backdoor functions including persistence, keylogging, file transfer, and screen capture. Researchers said the campaign also appeared to involve impersonation of a known Rust developer through a fake account to lend credibility to the poisoned dependency and encourage adoption. The malware communicated with a command-and-control endpoint at api.kakn[.]li, which resolved to 64.227.12[.]57, underscoring the risk that a single malicious package could infect trusted build environments and propagate into software supply chains.
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4 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
The attackers appeared to impersonate a known Rust developer using a fake account. SentinelLabs assessed this was likely intended to encourage trusted communities to reference the poisoned dependency.
Researchers found 15 malicious versions of the 'rustdecimal' crate, spanning versions 1.22.0 through 1.23.5. The version progression indicated the attackers were iteratively refining the malicious package over time.
SentinelLabs identified a typosquatted Rust crate named 'rustdecimal' on crates.io as part of the CrateDepression supply-chain attack. The package was designed to target GitLab CI environments and fetch a second-stage payload when the GITLAB_CI environment variable was present.
On 2022-05-19, SentinelLabs published its investigation into the CrateDepression Rust supply-chain attack, linking the malicious crate to a Go-based Mythic Poseidon agent. The report described the malware's Linux and macOS support, C2 infrastructure at api.kakn[.]li, and backdoor capabilities including persistence, keylogging, file transfer, and screen capture.
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Threat researchers uncovered multiple malware campaigns abusing trusted developer and AI distribution platforms to spread **Rust-based infostealers** through fake or typosquatted repositories. HiddenLayer found that a malicious Hugging Face project, `Open-OSS/privacy-filter`, impersonated OpenAI’s legitimate Privacy Filter repository, briefly became the platform’s top trending project, and was downloaded about **244,000** times before removal. The repository’s `loader.py` fetched a multi-stage payload ending in the `sefirah` infostealer, which harvested browser data, Discord tokens, cryptocurrency wallet data, SSH/FTP/VPN credentials, local files, system details, and screenshots, then exfiltrated the data to `recargapopular[.]com`. Researchers also linked the activity to overlaps with an npm typosquatting campaign associated with the **WinOS 4.0** implant. In a parallel campaign, Netskope reported that attackers impersonated the OpenClaw project with a fake installer site and a typosquatted GitHub organization to deliver a previously undocumented Rust dropper called **Hologram** and a modular implant framework. The malware targeted credentials from more than **250** cryptocurrency wallet, password manager, and 2FA browser extensions, while using anti-sandbox checks, in-memory .NET execution, reflective PE loading, persistence via `Userinit`, COM hijacking, and scheduled tasks, plus direct NT syscall thread injection. Operators staged and relayed infrastructure through legitimate services including **Azure DevOps, Telegram, Hookdeck, snippet.host, and Pastebin**; Netskope said the operation marked the first documented malware abuse of Hookdeck as a C2 relay and later evolved into a third wave, **Pathfinder**, that added confirmed Vidar infostealer delivery.
Jun 29, 2026
Two malicious Rust packages, named 'faster_log' and 'async_println', were discovered on the official Crates.io repository, where they were designed to steal private keys from cryptocurrency wallets, specifically targeting Solana and Ethereum users. These packages were downloaded nearly 8,500 times before their removal, with 'faster_log' accounting for 7,200 downloads and 'async_println' for 1,200. The malicious crates impersonated the legitimate 'fast_log' crate by copying its README file, repository metadata, and maintaining the original logging functionality to avoid suspicion among developers. The attackers embedded a payload within the crates that, upon execution, scanned the victim's environment and project source files for sensitive information, including hex strings resembling Ethereum private keys, Base58 strings similar to Solana keys or addresses, and bracketed byte arrays that could contain keys or seeds. When such data was found, it was bundled with the file path and line number and exfiltrated to a hardcoded Cloudflare Worker URL, which was confirmed to be live and accepting POST requests during the investigation. The malicious activity was discovered by researchers at the code security company Socket, who promptly reported it to Crates.io. In response, Crates.io removed both packages and suspended the publishing accounts, 'rustguruman' and 'dumbnbased', on September 24th. The incident highlights the risks associated with open-source software supply chains, where attackers can leverage trusted repositories to distribute malware to unsuspecting developers. The malicious crates did not have any dependent downstream crates, which may have limited the spread of the compromise. The attack demonstrates the sophistication of threat actors in mimicking legitimate projects to evade detection and the importance of vigilant monitoring of package repositories. The use of a legitimate logging functionality within the malicious crates further reduced suspicion, allowing the packages to remain undetected for several months. The exfiltration endpoint used by the attackers was not an official Solana RPC endpoint, indicating a deliberate attempt to disguise the data theft operation. This supply chain attack underscores the need for developers to verify the authenticity of third-party packages and for repository maintainers to implement robust security controls. The incident also serves as a warning to the broader cryptocurrency and developer communities about the ongoing threat of targeted attacks seeking to compromise digital assets through software dependencies. Security researchers continue to monitor for similar threats and advise immediate removal of the affected packages from any projects.
Jun 29, 2026
Security researchers reported multiple **software supply chain** campaigns targeting developers through malicious packages in public repositories, aiming to steal credentials/secrets and establish persistent access that can later impact production environments. Socket disclosed a campaign dubbed **StegaBin** involving **26 malicious npm packages** published over a two-day window that used a Pastebin “dead-drop” with **character-level steganography** to conceal C2 details, then resolved additional infrastructure across **31 Vercel deployments** to deliver platform-specific shell payloads that install a RAT and a **nine-module infostealer** targeting VSCode data, SSH keys, git repositories, browser credential stores, clipboard contents, and other local secrets. Socket assessed the tradecraft as consistent with activity previously attributed to **North Korea-aligned FAMOUS CHOLLIMA (Lazarus-linked)** and noted rapid detection of the packages shortly after publication. Separately, reporting highlighted **four malicious NuGet packages**—`NCryptYo`, `DOMOAuth2_`, `IRAOAuth2.0`, and `SimpleWriter_`—that targeted **ASP.NET** developers by exfiltrating **ASP.NET Identity** data (users/roles/permissions) and enabling backdoors; the packages were published in August 2024, accumulated **4,500+ downloads**, and were later removed. In that campaign, `NCryptYo` functioned as a dropper and proxy to an attacker-controlled C2, while `DOMOAuth2_` and `IRAOAuth2.0` handled data theft and backdoor rule delivery, and `SimpleWriter_` enabled file writing and hidden process execution while masquerading as a PDF utility. Other items in the set described unrelated C2 tooling trends (a Polygon blockchain-based botnet loader and the Vshell C2 framework) and do not describe the same package-repository supply chain incidents.
Jun 29, 2026