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Security researchers at Paradigm Shift disclosed usbliter8, a tethered BootROM exploit that achieves privileged SecureROM code execution on Apple devices using A12 and A13 processors, as well as Apple Watch S4/S5 chipsets. The exploit chains a flaw in the Synopsys DesignWare USB 2 controller with a firmware configuration weakness in the boot chain, allowing attackers with physical access to modify DFU mode, inject custom USB handlers, and boot unsigned iBoot images. Researchers said the issue affects immutable BootROM/SecureROM code, meaning software updates cannot fully fix vulnerable devices and hardware replacement is the most effective mitigation.
The public release included a GitHub repository and technical write-up describing hardware requirements and exploitation steps. Because the bug is exposed through low-level USB behavior that typical host stacks cannot reach, the exploit uses RP2350-based microcontroller boards such as the Waveshare RP2350 USB-A, Waveshare RP2350 Zero, Pimoroni TINY2350, and Raspberry Pi Pico 2. Paradigm Shift said A11 devices are not vulnerable due to different USB driver behavior, while A14 and later platforms appear harder to exploit because DART is configured correctly; Apple Product Security was notified before publication.
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A GitHub repository for usbliter8 was published with exploit code, hardware requirements, DFU handling details, and a Python control tool named usbliter8ctl. The repository documented support for A12, A13, and Apple Watch S4/S5 SoCs and explained post-exploitation capabilities such as demoting production mode or booting raw iBoot.
Paradigm Shift publicly introduced usbliter8, a tethered SecureROM/BootROM exploit affecting Apple A12 and A13 devices and Apple Watch S4/S5 chipsets. The disclosure described a chain involving a Synopsys DesignWare USB 2 controller flaw and a firmware configuration weakness to gain privileged SecureROM code execution.
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Researchers disclosed two separate boot-chain security issues that undermine trusted startup protections on major platforms. CERT/CC warned that outdated Microsoft-signed UEFI **shim** bootloaders—especially `shim` version `0.9` and earlier, including forked or unpatched builds used by vendors such as Red Hat Enterprise Linux, CentOS, Oracle, OpenSUSE, and WhiteCanyon—can be abused to bypass **Secure Boot** and run arbitrary code before the operating system loads. Because the attack executes in the early boot phase, it can evade EDR visibility and establish persistent compromise; Microsoft is responding by expanding the UEFI Forbidden Signature Database (**DBX**) to revoke vulnerable bootloaders, while administrators have been urged to update signature databases first and test carefully to avoid leaving systems unbootable. Paradigm Shift also disclosed an **unpatchable BootROM flaw** in Apple `A12` and `A13` chips and released a proof-of-concept exploit, `usbliter8`, showing that affected devices from the iPhone XS through the iPhone 11 line can be compromised during startup. The bug stems from USB controller behavior in SecureROM that allows unauthorized memory writes via crafted packets, enabling temporary reduction of security settings, booting of unsigned software, and the familiar `PWND` USB serial marker after exploitation. Apple was notified before publication, but because the weakness is embedded in silicon, software updates cannot fully eliminate the risk for affected devices over their operational lifetime.
Jun 29, 2026
Researchers have booted a jailbroken build of **iOS 27.0 beta 2** on an **iPhone 11 Pro** by combining the `usbliter8` SecureROM exploit with a heavily modified custom firmware workflow. The demonstration targets **A12 and A13** devices through **DFU mode**, requires physical access and specialized USB hardware, and shows that flaws in Apple’s immutable bootrom can still be used to undermine the boot chain on older hardware even after major iOS upgrades. Because the attack abuses SecureROM code, it cannot be fully fixed through a standard iOS software update. The project reportedly introduced build-specific patches for build `24A5370h` and altered kernel, userland, and system services to bypass protections including **USB Restricted Mode**, sandbox controls, and **AMFI** trust-cache checks. The modified device was able to load altered boot components and support capabilities such as SSH access, a bootstrap environment, and **Sileo**, but the jailbreak remains highly experimental and can disrupt **SEP-dependent features**, passcode support, Wi‑Fi, baseband, Bluetooth, and Apple services. No CVE, CVSS score, Apple advisory, or public evidence of in-the-wild exploitation was reported in the cited coverage.
Jul 27, 2026
Security researchers and vendors reported **hardware/firmware-level vulnerabilities in Android chip components** that can enable deep device compromise beyond typical app-layer defenses. Ledger’s Donjon research described a flaw involving **MediaTek chip boot-chain behavior and Trustonic’s trusted execution environment (TEE)** that allowed rapid physical compromise: by connecting an affected phone to a laptop over **USB**, attackers could allegedly brute-force the PIN, decrypt storage, and extract sensitive data including messages and **cryptocurrency wallet seed phrases** (e.g., Kraken Wallet, Phantom). The researchers estimated the affected MediaTek chips appear in roughly **one-quarter of Android phones**, disproportionately in lower-cost devices. Separately, Zimperium reported active exploitation of a **Qualcomm graphics zero-day** (**CVE-2026-21385**) in targeted Android attacks, describing a memory-corruption condition that could enable code execution or unauthorized access across “hundreds” of Qualcomm chipsets. A ZDNET article on Android’s *Repair Mode* primarily provides user guidance and anecdotal troubleshooting around a buggy March update/SIM recognition issue; it does not substantively address the chip-level vulnerabilities described in the other reporting and is best treated as tangential consumer advice rather than incident or vulnerability intelligence.
Jun 29, 2026