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Researchers detailed two active Russia-linked threat operations using different intrusion models to target Western organizations. TA577, a phishing group active since 2020, was observed sending HTML attachments that force outbound SMB connections to file:// URLs in order to capture NTLMv2 authentication handshakes and steal credential hashes. Infrastructure hunting tied the campaign to a narrowed set of likely servers identified through Impacket-like 8-character SMB target names, a distinctive SMB server GUID, shared SSH banner hashes, and recurring hosting patterns across providers including GLOBALWAYS; some hosts also exposed a "We’ll back soon.." page, login panels, or default Apache pages.
A separate analysis examined NoName057(16), a pro-Russian hacktivist collective that has sustained disruptive attacks against Western targets, especially Italian banks, government entities, military infrastructure, and public administrations. The group operates a volunteer-driven DDoS ecosystem known as DDosia or People Go Stresser 2.0, combining attack tools, support channels, operational guidance, and cryptocurrency rewards to coordinate participants. Its operations primarily use Layer 7 HTTP floods and Layer 4 TCP-SYN attacks, with most traffic aimed at TLS/443 services but also hitting SSH, FTP, and secure email ports; researchers also noted prior links between the collective and Bobik RAT infections used to support DDoS activity.
TTPs, infrastructure, and targeting history in one profile.
6 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
The November 2024 report describes NoName057(16)'s reliance on the DDosia, or 'People Go Stresser 2.0,' ecosystem, including attack tooling, support channels, operational guidance, and cryptocurrency-based rewards for participants.
The L M reference says the pro-Russian hacktivist collective NoName057(16) has been highly active since March 2022, primarily conducting DDoS attacks against Western organizations.
A later community hunt rule highlighted the significance of four ASNs and the SMB authentication type 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.2.10 for identifying infrastructure linked to the TA577 campaign.
Using hunt rules based on Impacket-like 8-character SMB target names, a distinctive SMB server GUID, and a shared SSH banner hash, the Intel-Ops analysis reduced 257 IPs to 27 likely related hosts, including six known true positives.
Deutsche Telekom CERT reported TA577 sending HTML files that trigger outbound SMB connections to file:// URLs in an attempt to capture victims' NTLMv2 handshake data and credential hashes.
The Intel-Ops reference states that TA577, a Russia-based threat group, has been known for phishing campaigns since 2020 and has delivered malware including Qbot, IcedID, SystemBC, SmokeLoader, Ursnif, Cobalt Strike, and later Pikabot and DarkGate.
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Pro-Russian hacktivist group **NoName057(16)** intensified distributed denial-of-service attacks against government and private-sector targets across Europe, including Dutch public services disrupted around the NATO Summit in The Hague. Reported incidents in the Netherlands included attacks on municipal and provincial websites and an earlier strike on **Logius** that temporarily affected **DigiD** and access to services used by the **Belastingdienst**, **UWV**, **DUO**, and hospital portals. The group has also targeted organizations in Ukraine, Israel, and other European countries, often timing attacks to politically significant events and focusing on sectors such as government, transportation, banking, defense, media, and energy. The group’s operations relied on **Telegram** for propaganda, recruitment, and coordination, while the **DDoSia** platform distributed encrypted attack parameters to volunteers who could be rewarded with cryptocurrency. Reporting also linked the ecosystem to malware including **Bobik** and **RedLine Stealer**, which were used to support involuntary participation in attacks. An international law-enforcement action, **Operation Eastwood**, led by Europol and Eurojust, disrupted more than 100 servers tied to the network and resulted in arrests, warrants, and notifications to participants, dealing a significant blow to the group’s infrastructure even as its public claims were described as overstating real-world impact.
Jul 7, 2026
SOCRadar reported a coordinated, multi-country **DDoS campaign** attributed to pro-Russian actor **NoName057(16)** using the **DDoSia** tool, with **5,830** recorded attack entries against **160 domains** and **181 IPs** during the Jan 26–Feb 1, 2026 analysis window. The activity showed broad geographic targeting, led by the **UK (55%)**, followed by **Ukraine (12.7%)** and **Czechia (4.9%)**, and focused heavily on public-sector and critical-service targets; the report also noted frequent target-list updates distributed via Telegram and that **port 443** was the most targeted. Separately, Polish authorities (CBCZ) arrested and then bailed a **20-year-old** suspected of running a multi-layered botnet used to DDoS “numerous popular websites,” including sites described as strategically important, using “C2 stresser” and command-and-control nodes; police seized equipment and claimed to have dismantled infrastructure used to host/distribute DDoS tools, with additional arrests possible. An NSFOCUS monthly report on **December 2025 APT activity** (e.g., TransparentTribe, Sidewinder, Konni, Gamaredon) describes broader spear-phishing-led intrusion trends and is not tied to the NoName057(16) DDoSia activity or the Polish DDoS case.
Jun 29, 2026
**NoName057(16)** has been identified as a pro-Russian hacktivist group conducting distributed denial-of-service (**DDoS**) attacks against websites tied to governments, news agencies, military organizations, suppliers, telecommunications providers, transportation authorities, and financial institutions. The group’s operations have focused on Ukraine and countries supporting Ukraine, with reported targeting that includes **Estonia, Lithuania, Norway, and Poland**. Reporting links the group to the **Dosia/DDoSia** malware family and describes an operation that has evolved through publicly documented infrastructure, targeting patterns, and campaign activity. The activity reflects a sustained disruptive effort aimed at public- and private-sector online services in European states aligned with Ukraine, reinforcing the group’s role as a persistent politically motivated DDoS threat.
Aug 14, 2026