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Supply Chain Attacks Poison Developer Packages and ToolJet Plugins for Credential Theft and RCE

Supply Chain Risk · 2 sources · Updated 5mo ago · First seen Jun 25, 2026

Supply Chain Attacks Poison Developer Packages and ToolJet Plugins for Credential Theft and RCE

Researchers disclosed multiple software supply chain attacks that abused trusted package and plugin distribution paths to steal secrets and execute attacker code. SlowMist detailed the TrapDoor operation, which spread through more than 34 malicious packages and 384 versions across npm, PyPI, and Crates.io, using postinstall hooks, Python import-time execution, and Rust build.rs scripts to harvest credentials, cloud secrets, browser data, and cryptocurrency wallet files. The npm branch added encrypted exfiltration, arbitrary command execution, Git hook injection, shell persistence, and poisoning of AI-assistant context files such as .cursorrules and CLAUDE.md, while infrastructure on GitHub Pages, raw.githubusercontent.com, api.github.com, and webhook.site helped the traffic blend into normal developer activity.

A separate SlowMist investigation found that legitimate npm package node-ipc was compromised through malicious releases 9.1.6, 9.2.3, and 12.0.1, which appended obfuscated code to node-ipc.cjs and exfiltrated AWS credentials, SSH keys, environment variables, and host data over fragmented DNS queries after applications loaded the package with require("node-ipc"). In parallel, ToolJet disclosed a critical instance-wide remote code execution flaw in ToolJet 3.x that let any authenticated builder overwrite a globally shared marketplace plugin with attacker-controlled JavaScript, causing server-side execution whenever other users ran queries through the poisoned plugin; the advisory cited weak authorization, shared plugin records, unsafe vm.runInNewContext() exposure of require and process, and missing integrity checks for plugin code fetched from GitHub.

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Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

4 events · May 14, 2026 – Jun 12, 2026
  1. Jun 12, 20265mo ago

    ToolJet discloses marketplace plugin poisoning RCE

    A GitHub security advisory disclosed a critical ToolJet 3.x vulnerability that lets any authenticated builder overwrite a globally shared marketplace plugin with attacker-controlled JavaScript, leading to instance-wide server-side remote code execution. The advisory documented the authorization flaw, unsafe execution path, and a proof of concept for plugin poisoning and query-triggered execution.

    ToolJet - Marketplace Plugin Poisoning Enables Instance-Wide Remote Code Execution · Advisory · ToolJet/ToolJet · GitHub
  2. May 28, 20266mo ago

    SlowMist publishes technical analysis of TrapDoor

    SlowMist published an analysis of the TrapDoor campaign, linking Python and npm samples through shared infrastructure and detailing credential theft, persistence, AI context poisoning, and exfiltration techniques. The report also examined a Rust package that stole wallet files during compilation, though SlowMist said its linkage to the broader cluster was not independently verified at code level.

    Threat Intelligence | TrapDoor Analysis: A Cross-Ecosystem Supply Chain Credential Theft Operation | by SlowMist | May, 2026 | Medium
  3. May 24, 20266mo ago

    Socket.dev first discloses the TrapDoor campaign

    The TrapDoor cross-ecosystem supply chain operation was first disclosed by Socket.dev on May 24, 2026. The campaign involved more than 34 malicious packages and 384 published versions across npm, PyPI, and Crates.io.

    Threat Intelligence | TrapDoor Analysis: A Cross-Ecosystem Supply Chain Credential Theft Operation | by SlowMist | May, 2026 | Medium
  4. May 14, 20266mo ago

    Malicious node-ipc releases published to npm

    SlowMist identified three malicious node-ipc releases—9.1.6, 9.2.3, and 12.0.1—published on May 14, 2026. The poisoned versions appended obfuscated code to the CommonJS entry file to steal credentials and exfiltrate data via fragmented DNS queries.

    Threat Intelligence | Analysis of the node-ipc Supply Chain Compromise and Poisoning Attack | by SlowMist | May, 2026 | Medium
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