Supply Chain Attacks Poison Developer Packages and ToolJet Plugins for Credential Theft and RCE
Supply Chain Risk · 2 sources · Updated 5mo ago · First seen Jun 25, 2026

Researchers disclosed multiple software supply chain attacks that abused trusted package and plugin distribution paths to steal secrets and execute attacker code. SlowMist detailed the TrapDoor operation, which spread through more than 34 malicious packages and 384 versions across npm, PyPI, and Crates.io, using postinstall hooks, Python import-time execution, and Rust build.rs scripts to harvest credentials, cloud secrets, browser data, and cryptocurrency wallet files. The npm branch added encrypted exfiltration, arbitrary command execution, Git hook injection, shell persistence, and poisoning of AI-assistant context files such as .cursorrules and CLAUDE.md, while infrastructure on GitHub Pages, raw.githubusercontent.com, api.github.com, and webhook.site helped the traffic blend into normal developer activity.
A separate SlowMist investigation found that legitimate npm package node-ipc was compromised through malicious releases 9.1.6, 9.2.3, and 12.0.1, which appended obfuscated code to node-ipc.cjs and exfiltrated AWS credentials, SSH keys, environment variables, and host data over fragmented DNS queries after applications loaded the package with require("node-ipc"). In parallel, ToolJet disclosed a critical instance-wide remote code execution flaw in ToolJet 3.x that let any authenticated builder overwrite a globally shared marketplace plugin with attacker-controlled JavaScript, causing server-side execution whenever other users ran queries through the poisoned plugin; the advisory cited weak authorization, shared plugin records, unsafe vm.runInNewContext() exposure of require and process, and missing integrity checks for plugin code fetched from GitHub.


