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A multi-stage phishing campaign is delivering Phantom Stealer v3.5.0 through compressed archive attachments that contain obfuscated JavaScript, using shipment and tax-audit lures that impersonate trusted organizations including UPS Forwarding Hub and Malaysia’s Inland Revenue Board (LHDN). After a victim opens the attachment, the JavaScript launches hidden PowerShell stages that decode and decrypt additional payloads with AES and XOR, keeping much of the activity in memory to reduce detection.
The final payload is reflectively executed and injected into aspnet_compiler.exe, where it steals system information, browser credentials, cookies, payment card data, cryptocurrency wallet files, and messaging application data. The stolen information is then exfiltrated over authenticated SMTP on TCP port 587 using EHLO, STARTTLS, and AUTH LOGIN with Base64-encoded credentials; researchers said they could not conclusively attribute the activity to a specific threat actor, noting that Phantom Stealer is broadly available in the cybercriminal ecosystem.
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Seqrite reported a multi-stage phishing campaign delivering Phantom Stealer v3.5.0 via compressed archive attachments containing obfuscated JavaScript, using business-themed lures impersonating UPS Forwarding Hub and Malaysia's Inland Revenue Board. The analysis described in-memory PowerShell staging, reflective execution via aspnet_compiler.exe, data theft from browsers, wallets, and messaging apps, and SMTP exfiltration over port 587, while noting no conclusive threat actor attribution.
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PhantomStealer v3.5.0 was deployed in multiple phishing campaigns using invoice, RFQ, maritime, and industrial lures delivered as heavily obfuscated JavaScript droppers. Across the observed samples, the malware followed a consistent multi-stage chain: Windows Script Host launched PowerShell, decrypted additional payloads, reflectively loaded .NET components, and hollowed the signed Microsoft binary `Aspnet_compiler.exe` to run the final infostealer. Researchers tied the activity to the PhantomStealer malware-as-a-service ecosystem advertised via `phantomsoftwares.site` and the Telegram identity **Oldphantomoftheopera**, with builder-generated samples showing per-build customization but a stable framework, anti-analysis logic, and optional persistence. The payloads stole browser credentials, cookies, credit cards, email and messaging data, Wi-Fi passwords, screenshots, keystrokes, and cryptocurrency wallet information, while some builds also enabled a crypto clipper that replaced wallet addresses across multiple chains. The campaigns abused legitimate but compromised infrastructure for both delivery and exfiltration, including a Portuguese theater website hosting encrypted PowerShell stages, a Chilean mail server and a Malaysian business email account used as SMTP relays, and Romanian FTP hosting used by another PhantomStealer build. Exfiltration varied by sample—SMTP to attacker mailboxes at `graceishere.tech`, Telegram Bot API, Discord, or FTP—but infrastructure overlap repeatedly linked the deployments back to the same MaaS operation, and one report also connected a PhantomStealer FTP campaign to related AgentTesla activity through shared submissions and tooling. The targeting and lure themes indicate a focus on procurement, shipping, maritime, industrial, and accounts receivable personnel, while the repeated use of compromised SMB hosting and mail systems suggests operators favored hijacked third-party services over dedicated attacker-owned infrastructure.
Jun 29, 2026
Proofpoint and Splunk report renewed activity tied to **Phantom Stealer**, a Windows infostealer linked to the broader **Stealerium** malware family, as threat actors expand phishing and malicious-download campaigns aimed at harvesting identities and credentials. Proofpoint observed campaigns attributed to **TA2715** and **TA2536** using lures themed around payments, court summons, donations, travel, hospitality, and adult content, delivered through compressed executables, JavaScript, VBScript, ISO/IMG, and ACE attachments. The malware family, derived from an open-source .NET codebase, has proliferated into overlapping variants including Phantom and Warp Stealer. Once executed, Phantom Stealer collects browser credentials, cookies, autofill data, session tokens, FTP and SSH client secrets, email client data, VPN configurations, cryptocurrency wallet information, and other files from compromised Windows systems. Reported behaviors include application enumeration, access to browser SQLite stores such as `Login Data`, `Cookies`, and `Web Data`, unauthorized reads of WinSCP configuration folders, registry run key or scheduled-task persistence, Wi-Fi reconnaissance, PowerShell-based Windows Defender exclusions, and in some variants abuse of Chrome remote debugging to bypass browser protections and steal active sessions. Stolen data has been archived and exfiltrated through encrypted channels and services including SMTP, Discord webhooks, Telegram, and GoFile, increasing the risk of account takeover, fraud, and follow-on enterprise compromise.
Jul 13, 2026
A sophisticated phishing campaign known as Operation MoneyMount-ISO has been identified targeting finance, accounting, treasury, and payment departments in Russia. Attackers use Russian-language emails impersonating financial institutions, such as TorFX Currency Broker, to deliver ZIP attachments containing malicious ISO files. When executed, these ISO files mount as virtual drives and deploy executables that load the Phantom information-stealing malware, which is capable of credential theft, invoice and payment fraud, and unauthorized fund transfers. The campaign also targets secondary sectors including procurement, legal, HR/payroll, executive assistants, and Russian-speaking SMEs, posing significant risks of lateral movement within IT systems. Technical analysis reveals that the infection chain involves a multi-stage payload delivery, with the initial executable loading a DLL (`CreativeAI.dll`) that decrypts and injects the final Phantom Stealer payload into memory. The campaign demonstrates advanced social engineering and technical sophistication, leveraging fake payment confirmation lures and ISO mounting to bypass traditional security controls. Security researchers emphasize the need for heightened vigilance among Russian financial organizations and recommend monitoring for related IOCs and MITRE ATT&CK techniques associated with this threat.
Jun 29, 2026