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Huntress reported an active credential-stuffing and brute-force campaign targeting SonicWall VPN and firewall login portals, compromising 30 organizations and 92 user accounts in roughly 41 hours. The activity began on July 25 and used authorized logins against remote access interfaces rather than exploiting a software vulnerability, with attacks described as broad and opportunistic instead of focused on a particular sector. Huntress said the observed victims were all its customers using SonicWall devices, indicating the total number of affected organizations could be higher.
Investigators traced the automated credential-validation activity to a small set of malicious IP addresses registered to DigitalOcean and said the pattern aligns with recurring SonicWall SSLVPN targeting seen in 2025 and 2026, including abuse of reused compromised credentials. Huntress said it had not yet observed post-compromise hands-on-keyboard activity, raising concern that the intrusions may be intended to pre-position access for later operations. At the time of reporting, SonicWall said it was investigating and had not issued a security advisory, while Huntress urged defenders to restrict remote management, reset credentials and secrets, review authentication logs, and enforce MFA.
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On July 28, 2026, Huntress published a threat advisory on the active SonicWall credential-stuffing campaign, describing it as broad, opportunistic, and automated. The advisory disclosed five malicious DigitalOcean-hosted source IP addresses and mapped the activity to ATT&CK techniques including credential stuffing, external remote services, and valid accounts.
Within about 41 hours of the campaign's start, Huntress observed compromises at 30 organizations and 92 unique user accounts through authorized logins against SonicWall remote access portals. Huntress reported no post-compromise hands-on-keyboard activity at that stage, suggesting possible pre-positioning.
Huntress said a broad, opportunistic credential-stuffing and brute-force campaign targeting SonicWall VPN and firewall logins began on July 25, 2026. The activity used automated credential validation from a small set of malicious IP addresses registered to DigitalOcean.
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Threat actors have launched a widespread campaign targeting SonicWall SSL VPN devices, resulting in the compromise of over 100 accounts across at least 16 customer environments. Security firm Huntress reported that attackers are rapidly authenticating into multiple accounts on compromised devices, indicating possession of valid credentials rather than relying on brute-force methods. The campaign began in earnest around October 4, 2025, with authentication attempts traced to a specific IP address, 202.155.8[.]73. In some cases, attackers disconnected after brief access, but in others, they conducted network scanning and attempted to access local Windows accounts, suggesting a range of post-compromise activities. The incident follows SonicWall’s disclosure of a security breach involving unauthorized exposure of firewall configuration backup files stored in MySonicWall accounts, which could provide attackers with sensitive information such as user and group settings, DNS configurations, and certificates. Although there is no direct evidence linking the configuration file breach to the VPN compromises, the risk of credential exposure remains high, prompting advisories for organizations to reset credentials on live firewall devices. Concurrently, security teams observed a surge in Akira ransomware incidents exploiting SonicWall SSL VPN devices, initially suspected to be due to a zero-day but later attributed to the known vulnerability CVE-2024-40766. This vulnerability, an improper access control flaw in SonicOS, affects multiple generations of SonicWall devices and was first disclosed and patched in August 2024. Despite the availability of a patch, unpatched devices remain vulnerable and have been actively targeted by Akira ransomware affiliates. In one documented case, Darktrace detected suspicious activity including network scanning, lateral movement, privilege escalation, and data exfiltration on a customer’s network, with approximately 2 GiB of data exfiltrated before the attack was contained. The attackers’ tactics included leveraging both the CVE-2024-40766 vulnerability and misconfigurations to gain access. The campaign underscores the importance of timely patching and credential hygiene, as attackers are exploiting both technical vulnerabilities and exposed credentials to infiltrate networks. Organizations using SonicWall’s cloud backup service are particularly at risk if they have not reset credentials following the configuration file exposure. Security advisories recommend immediate credential resets and patching of all affected SonicWall devices to mitigate ongoing threats. The incidents highlight the persistent threat posed by ransomware groups like Akira, who continue to exploit both new and previously disclosed vulnerabilities in widely deployed network infrastructure. The rapid detection and response by managed security services, such as those provided by Darktrace, have proven effective in limiting the impact of these attacks. However, the scale and speed of the current campaign demonstrate the attackers’ ability to coordinate and execute widespread compromises across multiple organizations. The situation remains dynamic, with ongoing investigations into the full extent of the compromise and the potential links between credential exposure and active exploitation. Organizations are urged to review their SonicWall device configurations, monitor for suspicious authentication activity, and ensure all security patches are applied without delay.
Jun 29, 2026
SonicWall experienced a significant security incident in early October 2025, resulting in the unauthorized access of firewall configuration backup files for all customers utilizing the MySonicWall cloud backup service. The breach exposed sensitive configuration data, including device settings, encrypted credentials, VPN configurations, private keys, and administrator information. Although the credentials and secrets were protected with AES-256 encryption, the exposure of this data raised substantial concerns about the potential for further exploitation, especially in cases where weak or reused passwords were present. Forensic analysis conducted by SonicWall in collaboration with Mandiant confirmed that 100% of cloud backup customers were affected, making this a global event with far-reaching implications for network security. Following the breach, security researchers, including those at Huntress, observed a marked increase in SonicWall SSLVPN account compromises starting on October 4, 2025. Over 100 accounts across 16 customer environments were breached, with attackers using valid credentials rather than brute-force methods. The malicious activity was traced to a single IP address (202.155.8[.]73), and attackers were seen rapidly authenticating, conducting network scans, and attempting lateral movement within affected environments. In some cases, attackers disconnected quickly, but in others, they pursued deeper access by targeting local Windows accounts. Evidence suggests that the Akira ransomware group may be leveraging both the stolen credentials and known SSLVPN vulnerabilities to facilitate these intrusions. While Huntress did not find direct evidence linking the observed SSLVPN compromises to the configuration file breach, the timing and nature of the attacks have raised concerns about a possible connection. The exposed configuration files, even though encrypted, could potentially be decoded by determined attackers, revealing authentication passwords and keys in their encrypted form. This scenario underscores the risk posed by the breach, particularly if attackers are able to crack or otherwise obtain the necessary decryption keys. SonicWall and security vendors have issued urgent guidance to affected customers, recommending immediate review of the MySonicWall portal for impact assessment and the implementation of enhanced security measures. System administrators are advised to follow SonicWall’s security checklist, which includes steps such as resetting credentials, reviewing access logs, and applying any available patches or mitigations. The incident has prompted widespread concern within the security community due to the scale of the exposure and the potential for further exploitation. The breach highlights the critical importance of strong encryption, robust credential management, and rapid incident response in cloud-based security services. It also demonstrates the potential for configuration data leaks to serve as a springboard for targeted attacks, including ransomware campaigns. Organizations using SonicWall products are urged to remain vigilant, monitor for signs of compromise, and coordinate closely with SonicWall and their security partners to mitigate ongoing risks. The incident serves as a stark reminder of the evolving threat landscape facing managed security service providers and their customers.
Jun 29, 2026
SonicWall warned that multiple critical flaws in **Gen 6, Gen 6.5, Gen 7, and TZ80** firewalls could allow authentication bypass, arbitrary outbound connections, privileged access, and possible remote code execution on exposed devices. The disclosed issues include **`CVE-2024-40762`**, **`CVE-2024-53704`**, **`CVE-2024-53705`**, and **`CVE-2024-53706`**, with guidance to immediately install vendor updates and, if patching is delayed, disable Internet-exposed **SSLVPN** or restrict access to trusted sources. Authorities also urged organizations to review logs for suspicious local-user login attempts and other anomalous access patterns. Subsequent incident reporting tied real-world compromises of **SonicWall Gen 7** firewalls with **SSLVPN** enabled to **`CVE-2024-40766`** and password-related weaknesses introduced during **Gen 6 to Gen 7** migrations, rather than to a new zero-day as initially feared. SonicWall said many successful intrusions appeared to involve migrated local user passwords that had not been reset, creating an opening for network breaches and potential ransomware activity. Recommended mitigations include upgrading to **firmware 7.3.0**, resetting local SSLVPN user passwords, disabling unused accounts, enabling **MFA**, Botnet Protection, and Geo-IP Filtering, and limiting SSLVPN access by IP where the service remains necessary.
Jun 29, 2026