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OpenAI reported a likely China-origin covert influence operation, dubbed “Sponsored Discontent,” that used ChatGPT to generate short English-language comments and long-form Spanish-language articles critical of the United States. The activity reportedly followed mainland China business-hour patterns, used Chinese-language prompts, and in some cases was tied through article bylines to Jilin Yousen Culture Communication Co., Ltd. The operation also produced social media posts attacking Chinese dissident Cai Xia, behavior OpenAI said was partly consistent with Spamouflage tactics.
The campaign’s most significant outcome was the successful placement of translated and expanded anti-U.S. narratives from publicly available Chinese-language sources into mainstream Latin American news outlets, particularly in Peru, and also in Mexico and Ecuador, at times apparently as sponsored content. OpenAI assessed the activity as a Breakout Scale Category 4 influence operation because it penetrated widely read media sites rather than remaining confined to social platforms.
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OpenAI reported that the anti-U.S. Spanish-language article activity was particularly prevalent in the lead-up to the 2024 APEC Forum in Peru. The operation's narratives focused on U.S. social and political divisions and were sometimes apparently placed as sponsored content.
A likely China-origin influence operation used OpenAI models to translate and expand Chinese-language source material into Spanish-language articles critical of the United States, which were then published by mainstream news sites in Peru, Mexico, and Ecuador. OpenAI said this was the first time it had observed a likely Chinese influence actor successfully placing such content in mainstream Latin American outlets.
OpenAI reported that it banned ChatGPT accounts involved in the operation it dubbed Sponsored Discontent. The banned accounts had used OpenAI models for both anti-U.S. Spanish-language article generation and Cai Xia-focused influence content.
The same operation generated short English-language comments and images criticizing Cai Xia, which were posted on X by accounts posing as people from the United States or India. OpenAI found this activity had limited authentic engagement and noted some behavior was consistent with Spamouflage.
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OpenAI said two likely China-linked influence operations used ChatGPT to generate images and social media posts aimed at divisive U.S. debates over AI infrastructure and trade policy. The clusters, dubbed **"Data Center Bandwagon"** and **"Tech and Tariffs,"** produced English- and Chinese-language content that portrayed data center expansion as driving up electricity prices, straining power grids, consuming water, and harming the environment, while separate posts framed U.S. tariffs as a covert tool for controlling the global technology landscape. OpenAI said the operators likely originated in China, used VPNs, prompted ChatGPT in simplified Chinese, and posed as Americans on platforms including **X** and **YouTube**. OpenAI assessed that neither campaign achieved meaningful engagement and found no evidence the operators created the underlying controversies or materially shaped them, but the activity showed how AI tools can be used to amplify existing domestic disputes. The company also found the actors used ChatGPT for operational support, including editing work reports containing OPSEC details and discussing ways to exploit Facebook’s ecosystem and evade Meta’s coordinated inauthentic behavior detection. A separate analysis said the activity appeared tied to a private Chinese technology contractor serving provincial government clients, reflecting a deniable, scalable model aligned with broader Chinese propaganda patterns and strategic competition over U.S. AI and data center buildout.
Jul 31, 2026
OpenAI reported that a **ChatGPT account linked to Chinese law enforcement** used the model to review and edit internal write-ups on so-called **“cyber special operations,”** which OpenAI assessed as activity consistent with **covert influence operations and transnational repression** aimed at harassing and silencing critics of the Chinese Communist Party. The uploaded materials described a sustained, resource-intensive campaign involving **hundreds of staff**, **thousands of fake social-media accounts**, mass content generation, and tactics such as flooding platforms with fraudulent complaints against dissidents, forging documents, and in some cases **impersonating U.S. officials** to intimidate targets. OpenAI said the activity was tied to a single account, which it **banned**. OpenAI also described an attempted **smear/propaganda operation targeting Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi**, where the actor prompted ChatGPT for plans to amplify negative commentary on social media and to draft messages from fake accounts to pressure other Japanese politicians; when the model refused, the actor’s later prompts suggested the operation proceeded using other AI models. Separately, OpenAI attributed another cluster of accounts likely originating from mainland China that used ChatGPT to seek information on **U.S. persons, online forums, and federal building locations**, and to draft emails posing as a Hong Kong-based firm (*Nimbus Hub Consulting*), with OpenAI noting indicators such as VPN usage and prompts written in **Simplified Chinese**.
Jun 29, 2026
OpenAI said it disrupted a small network of ChatGPT accounts linked to an operation it calls **“VAGue Focus,”** which used AI to generate social media posts, draft biographies, and translate outreach tied to apparent intelligence-gathering and social-engineering activity. According to the company, the actors posed as journalists, analysts, and consulting professionals associated with **Focus Lens News**, **BrightWave Media Europe**, and **Visionary Advisory Group**, and used the accounts to support outreach related to U.S. economic and financial policy topics. OpenAI reported that the operation used AI-generated content to build personas on **X** and to translate messages, including some outreach that offered payment for classified documents. Drawing on the broader challenge of measuring influence activity, the company assessed the public-facing influence component as **low impact**, citing little authentic engagement, while saying there was not enough evidence to determine whether the covert social-engineering effort succeeded.
Jul 31, 2026