NSO Group’s Pegasus Spyware Targeted Journalists and Activists While Android Analysis Exposed Its Capabilities
Threat Actor Intelligence · 6 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen Sep 27, 2022

Citizen Lab documented multiple Pegasus infections against civil society targets, including New York Times journalist Ben Hubbard and four Jordanian human rights defenders, lawyers, and journalists. Hubbard’s iPhone was reportedly infected twice through zero-click iMessage exploit chains tied to KISMET and FORCEDENTRY, after earlier SMS and WhatsApp lure attempts linked to a Saudi-associated operator. In Jordan, researchers found repeated Pegasus targeting between 2019 and 2021 and assessed that two operators, MANSAF and BLACKIRIS, were likely connected to Jordanian government agencies; one successful iPhone compromise occurred even after Apple sued NSO Group and began notifying victims.
Technical reporting and forensic guidance showed Pegasus was built for covert, persistent surveillance across mobile platforms. Google previously identified the Android variant Chrysaor on a small number of devices, describing capabilities including privilege escalation, persistence, keylogging, screenshot capture, data theft, and covert microphone use. Reverse-engineering of Pegasus for Android detailed command-and-control over HTTP with encrypted values, SMS-based command execution disguised as verification texts, exfiltration of messages, contacts, call logs, emails, and app data, plus live audio recording, screenshot capture, camera access, and self-deletion features; Amnesty International separately published forensic methodology to help investigators detect Pegasus infections.


