PlugX campaigns used DLL side-loading and fileless loaders to deploy RAT payloads
Malware Intelligence · 4 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen Dec 6, 2022

Multiple analyses detailed PlugX malware infections that relied on DLL side-loading and staged, in-memory execution to launch the final remote access trojan while minimizing on-disk artifacts. In one chain, a signed McAfee executable loaded a malicious McUtil.dll, which patched the host process and executed shellcode from Mc.cp; that shellcode decrypted and manually mapped a final PlugX DLL, which then injected into svchost.exe and contacted 45.79.125.11:443. A separate CIRCL report described a PlugX 7.0 variant delivered in a self-extracting archive that dropped a signed McAfee binary, a malicious DLL, and an encrypted payload, then decrypted and decompressed the payload in memory before injecting it into svchost.exe and msiexec.exe and beaconing to help.yahoo-upgrade.com:443.
Other samples tied to Mustang Panda and COVID-19-themed lures showed the same tradecraft with different loaders and decoys. One Mustang Panda sample used a malicious shortcut, a renamed legitimate LogMeIn executable, LMIGuardianDll.dll, and LMIGuardianDat.dat to decrypt shellcode, manually map a PlugX DLL, and display a decoy document named "Written comments of Hungary.docx"; its configuration was XOR-encrypted with the key jOh752oCI. Another fileless chain abused unsecapp.exe to load http_dll.dll, decrypt http_dll.dat in memory, and execute a final PlugX payload that established persistence through Run keys, communicated over HTTP POST or raw TCP on ports 80, 443, 8080, and 8000, and supported remote shell, file operations, reconnaissance, and hidden process execution.


