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PlugX campaigns used DLL side-loading and fileless loaders to deploy RAT payloads

Malware Intelligence · 4 sources · Updated 3mo ago · First seen Dec 6, 2022

PlugX campaigns used DLL side-loading and fileless loaders to deploy RAT payloads

Multiple analyses detailed PlugX malware infections that relied on DLL side-loading and staged, in-memory execution to launch the final remote access trojan while minimizing on-disk artifacts. In one chain, a signed McAfee executable loaded a malicious McUtil.dll, which patched the host process and executed shellcode from Mc.cp; that shellcode decrypted and manually mapped a final PlugX DLL, which then injected into svchost.exe and contacted 45.79.125.11:443. A separate CIRCL report described a PlugX 7.0 variant delivered in a self-extracting archive that dropped a signed McAfee binary, a malicious DLL, and an encrypted payload, then decrypted and decompressed the payload in memory before injecting it into svchost.exe and msiexec.exe and beaconing to help.yahoo-upgrade.com:443.

Other samples tied to Mustang Panda and COVID-19-themed lures showed the same tradecraft with different loaders and decoys. One Mustang Panda sample used a malicious shortcut, a renamed legitimate LogMeIn executable, LMIGuardianDll.dll, and LMIGuardianDat.dat to decrypt shellcode, manually map a PlugX DLL, and display a decoy document named "Written comments of Hungary.docx"; its configuration was XOR-encrypted with the key jOh752oCI. Another fileless chain abused unsecapp.exe to load http_dll.dll, decrypt http_dll.dat in memory, and execute a final PlugX payload that established persistence through Run keys, communicated over HTTP POST or raw TCP on ports 80, 443, 8080, and 8000, and supported remote shell, file operations, reconnaissance, and hidden process execution.

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Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

6 events · Mar 29, 2013 – Dec 6, 2022
  1. Reported Jan 9, 20234y ago

    Researcher publishes analysis of another PlugX sample

    A separate analysis documented a PlugX sample composed of Mc.exe, McUtil.dll, and Mc.cp, showing how the DLL patched the host process in memory, executed shellcode from Mc.cp, manually mapped the final PlugX DLL, and connected to 45.79.125.11:443 after injecting into svchost.exe.

    [QuickNote] Another nice PlugX sample | 0day in {REA_TEAM}
  2. Reported Dec 27, 20224y ago

    Researcher publishes Mustang Panda PlugX sample analysis

    A detailed analysis described how a legitimate LogMeIn binary side-loaded LMIGuardianDll.dll, which decrypted shellcode from LMIGuardianDat.dat and manually mapped a PlugX DLL exporting BLMSqofHz. The write-up also identified the PlugX configuration XOR key as "jOh752oCI" and noted an embedded decoy document named "Written comments of Hungary.docx."

    Diving into a PlugX sample of Mustang Panda group | 0day in {REA_TEAM}
  3. Dec 6, 20224y ago

    Mustang Panda PlugX sample submitted to VirusTotal

    A PlugX-related sample later analyzed as linked to Mustang Panda was submitted to VirusTotal from Latvia. The submission included a lure archive using a malicious LNK, a legitimate LogMeIn executable, a side-loaded DLL, and an encrypted data file.

    Diving into a PlugX sample of Mustang Panda group | 0day in {REA_TEAM}
  4. Reported Mar 17, 20207y ago

    COVID-19 lure PlugX chain analyzed by VinCSS

    VinCSS analyzed a fileless PlugX infection chain in which unsecapp.exe loaded http_dll.dll, decrypted http_dll.dat in memory, and executed a final HT.dll payload that established persistence and communicated with C2 over HTTP POST or raw TCP.

    Phân tích mã độc lợi dụng dịch Covid-19 để phát tán giả mạo “Chỉ thị của thủ tướng Nguyễn Xuân Phúc” - Phần 2 - VinCSS Blog
  5. Jun 6, 201412y ago

    PlugX sample includes date check against 20140606

    The analyzed PlugX loader sample contained a date check based on GetSystemTime that compared a computed value against 20140606 before continuing its patching and execution flow.

    [QuickNote] Another nice PlugX sample | 0day in {REA_TEAM}
  6. Mar 29, 201314y ago

    CIRCL documents PlugX 7.0 side-loading campaign

    A CIRCL report dated March 29, 2013 analyzed a PlugX 7.0 RAT variant that used DLL side-loading with a signed McAfee executable, decrypted and decompressed payloads in memory, injected into svchost.exe and msiexec.exe, and communicated with help.yahoo-upgrade.com over port 443.

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