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ANY.RUN reported that the Mirage2FA phishing-as-a-service platform has been targeting Microsoft 365 and Entra ID users with an adversary-in-the-middle reverse-proxy setup that captures credentials, MFA codes, and authenticated session cookies in real time. The operation, attributed to LinX Coders, has been active since September 2024 and remained operational through July 2026, targeting 9,426 email accounts across 3,518 organizational domains in 94 countries; 4,532 addresses showed indicators of potential compromise, and 63.7% of identified victims were in the United States.
The phishing chain used malicious .htm, .xhtml, and .svg attachments, QR-code links, HTML smuggling, obfuscated JavaScript, and WebSocket relays to legitimate Microsoft services to let users complete MFA before stealing their live sessions. Researchers linked the activity to infrastructure in the 185.174.100.0/24 subnet and to operator markers including LINXCODERSEMAIL, Telegram branding, and bot naming conventions. Because the attackers primarily hijack active sessions rather than just passwords, defenders were urged to revoke active sessions and refresh tokens in addition to resetting credentials and to use the published indicators and ATT&CK mappings for detection and response.
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On August 18, 2026, ANY.RUN published a technical threat intelligence report on Mirage2FA, detailing its Microsoft 365-focused AiTM phishing workflow, infrastructure, and attribution to LinX Coders. The report also documented indicators, delivery methods, and defensive recommendations such as revoking active sessions and refresh tokens after hijacking.
ANY.RUN reported thousands of Mirage2FA-related compromise events from late 2024 through 2026, including activity still ongoing in July 2026. The campaign targeted 9,426 accounts across 3,518 domains in 94 countries, with 4,532 addresses showing indicators of potential compromise.
ANY.RUN's analysis said the Mirage2FA phishing-as-a-service kit had been active since September 2024, targeting Microsoft 365 accounts with an adversary-in-the-middle setup to capture credentials, MFA codes, and session cookies.
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Three phishing-as-a-service platforms—**Sneaky 2FA**, **EvilTokens**, and **EvilProxy**—are targeting U.S. organizations to steal Microsoft 365 credentials and authenticated access by capturing session cookies or OAuth tokens after users complete legitimate sign-ins. The kits use different methods, including adversary-in-the-middle session hijacking, abuse of Microsoft’s OAuth 2.0 device authorization flow, and reverse-proxy credential relay, allowing attackers to gain access without breaking MFA cryptographically. Researchers said **EvilTokens**, which emerged in 2026, has already been linked to compromises at more than **340 Microsoft 365 organizations** across at least seven countries, while **EvilProxy** has been used in campaigns against executives and managers at more than **100 organizations**. The campaigns show that standard MFA does not stop phishing when attackers steal the resulting authenticated session artifact instead of the password alone. **Sneaky 2FA** reportedly uses CAPTCHA gates, IP filtering, and cloned Microsoft login pages to evade detection, while the broader activity has created detection opportunities around impossible device-shift patterns, anomalous token use, and suspicious device-code prompts. Defenders are being urged to deploy **phishing-resistant MFA** such as **FIDO2/WebAuthn**, restrict or disable unnecessary device-code authentication in **Entra ID**, and closely monitor Microsoft 365 environments for unexpected MFA prompts and token abuse.
Aug 5, 2026
A wave of sophisticated phishing campaigns is targeting organizations globally to steal Microsoft 365 credentials by bypassing traditional email security gateways and multi-factor authentication (MFA) protections. Attackers are employing advanced techniques such as multi-stage payload delivery using nested PDF attachments, legitimate content delivery networks, and mouse tracking to evade detection. Once victims interact with these emails and enter their credentials on a credential harvesting site, attackers leverage legitimate Microsoft infrastructure to bypass MFA and gain immediate access to the victim’s Microsoft 365 environment. These campaigns are engineered to filter out security analysts and block standard security tools, making detection and response more challenging. In parallel, threat actors are increasingly using attacker-in-the-middle toolkits like Evilginx and hybrid phishing-as-a-service kits such as Salty2FA and Tycoon2FA to capture both user credentials and session cookies. By stealing session cookies, attackers can impersonate users and maintain access without triggering additional MFA prompts, even after successful authentication. The blending of different phishing kits into hybrid strains is making detection harder, as traditional security rules tuned to individual kits are now being evaded. Security researchers warn that static indicators are no longer sufficient, and behavioral analysis is required to spot these evolving threats.
Jun 29, 2026
Active phishing campaigns are using the **Jalisco** and **OmegaLord** kits to compromise Microsoft 365 accounts with techniques designed to bypass or weaken multi-factor authentication. According to ReliaQuest, Jalisco abuses the OAuth 2.0 device authorization flow by generating fresh Microsoft device codes in real time and tricking victims into authorizing attacker-controlled devices, allowing attackers to obtain OAuth tokens without directly stealing passwords. OmegaLord uses a fake PDF reader login page to harvest credentials and victims’ phone numbers, which may help attackers intercept or manipulate MFA challenges. After gaining access, attackers have been observed moving quickly through SharePoint and other SaaS platforms to locate and exfiltrate sensitive data, sometimes within minutes, and may follow with extortion threats. ReliaQuest also reported that threat actors register multiple devices to compromised Microsoft Entra ID accounts to preserve access and refresh tokens even after password resets, reflecting a broader surge in phishing-as-a-service activity tied to platforms including **EvilTokens**, **Kali365**, **Tycoon2FA**, **Venom**, and **Darcula**. Defenders are being urged to reduce Entra ID device-registration limits, disable or restrict device code authentication through Conditional Access or Okta where not needed, and audit unnecessary app registrations.
Jul 23, 2026