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Malicious Visual Studio Code extensions have been used to infect software developers with the Evelyn Stealer, a multistage malware payload designed to abuse trust in developer tooling and compromise developer workstations. Reporting indicates the campaign used a first-stage downloader disguised as a Lightshot DLL, followed by a second-stage injector that decrypted and hollow-injected the final payload into grpconv.exe, while related analysis also linked the malware to screen-capture activity inside infected environments.
The final stealer employed anti-analysis and anti-virtual-machine checks, stole browser credentials through DLL injection, gathered system information and cryptocurrency wallet data, captured screenshots, and exfiltrated stolen data to attacker-controlled infrastructure over FTP. Researchers said the operation showed notable maturity through techniques including AES-256-CBC encryption, process hollowing, and targeted collection from developer systems, underscoring the risk posed by trojanized extensions in widely used coding platforms.
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On December 8, 2025, Koi.ai published findings about a campaign targeting software developers through weaponized Visual Studio Code extensions. The reporting described delivery of the Evelyn information stealer through a multistage infection chain.
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Trend Micro reported a multi-stage information-stealing campaign, dubbed **Evelyn Stealer**, that targets software developers by weaponizing the *Visual Studio Code* extension ecosystem. The operation relies on trojanized extensions as an initial access vector into developer environments, then uses staged loaders and stealth techniques (including process hollowing, DLL injection, and anti-analysis measures) to execute the infostealer and evade detection; Trend Micro noted the use of strong cryptography such as **AES-256-CBC** as part of the malware’s operational security. Once established, Evelyn Stealer focuses on harvesting high-value data commonly present on developer workstations, including browser credentials and cookies, cryptocurrency wallet data, screenshots, clipboard contents, Wi‑Fi details, and other sensitive artifacts that can enable broader compromise. Reporting also describes a specific execution chain in which a malicious extension drops a fake `Lightshot.dll` that is loaded by `LightShot.exe`, triggering a hidden PowerShell command to fetch and run a second-stage payload; stolen data and system details are then exfiltrated to attacker infrastructure (including an attacker-controlled **FTP** server). Researchers warned that compromising even a single developer endpoint could expose credentials and access paths that enable follow-on intrusion into production systems, cloud environments, and wider enterprise networks.
Jun 29, 2026
Security researchers reported **malicious Visual Studio Code extensions** being used as a software supply-chain vector to compromise developer workstations. One campaign impersonated a viral AI coding assistant (“**ClawdBot**”) via a fake extension (“ClawdBot Agent”) that appeared legitimate and even functioned as an AI assistant by integrating real APIs (e.g., OpenAI/Anthropic/Google), while **silently dropping malware on Windows at VS Code startup**. The observed payload delivery used camouflage filenames such as `Lightshot.exe` (and references to `Lightshot.dll`) and an Electron-style bundle name `Code.exe`, indicating an effort to blend into common developer tooling and evolve the dropper over time. A separate finding described an **Open VSX** extension masquerading as a popular **Angular Language Service** for VS Code, which bundled legitimate dependencies (e.g., `@angular/language-service` and `typescript`) alongside a **malicious loader** that activates when users open HTML or TypeScript files (`onLanguage:html`, `onLanguage:typescript`). The loader decrypts an embedded payload using **AES-256-CBC** (Node.js `crypto`), with a hardcoded IV and a large hex-encoded ciphertext, then delays and executes the decrypted code—behavior consistent with staged malware delivery and potential worm-like propagation through widely installed editor extensions.
Jun 29, 2026
Security researchers have identified two malicious extensions on the Microsoft Visual Studio Code Marketplace, named *Bitcoin Black* and *Codo AI*, which were designed to infect developer machines with information-stealing malware. These extensions, published under the developer name 'BigBlack', masqueraded as a premium dark theme and an AI-powered coding assistant, but secretly downloaded additional payloads, took screenshots, and exfiltrated sensitive data such as code, emails, Slack messages, WiFi passwords, clipboard contents, and browser sessions to attacker-controlled servers. Microsoft has since removed these extensions from the marketplace after their discovery, but not before they were downloaded and installed by several users. The malware leveraged PowerShell and batch scripts to download and execute payloads, with later versions hiding execution windows to evade user detection. Technical analysis revealed that both extensions delivered a legitimate Lightshot screenshot tool alongside a malicious DLL, which was loaded via DLL hijacking to deploy the infostealer under the name `runtime.exe`. The malicious DLL was detected by multiple antivirus engines and created persistence by establishing directories in the `%APPDATA%\Local\` path. The Codo AI extension embedded its malicious code within a functioning tool, making it harder to detect, while Bitcoin Black activated on every VS Code action. The campaign highlights the risks of third-party extensions in developer environments and the need for vigilance when installing tools from public marketplaces.
Jun 29, 2026