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Researchers identified NovaCookies, a phishing-as-a-service platform that rents adversary-in-the-middle infrastructure for about $320 per month to steal authenticated Microsoft 365 sessions in real time. Victims are lured through trusted-looking DocuSign document-share messages—sometimes involving legitimate DocuSign envelopes—and may be redirected through genuine Microsoft or Google sign-in pages before reaching attacker-controlled infrastructure. After users provide credentials and MFA factors, the service captures session cookies, enabling account takeover despite MFA protections.
NovaCookies has used at least 755 domains, with nearly 90% of observed lures tied to .vu domains, and has targeted hundreds of organizations; 49.2% of observed targeting was directed at U.S. organizations. The platform uses disposable infrastructure, short-lived context binding, proof-of-work challenges, and browser checks to evade automated scanning and analysis. Defenders should prioritize phishing-resistant FIDO authentication, managed-device restrictions, monitoring for browser and token anomalies, and immediate revocation of active sessions and refresh tokens after suspected compromise.
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2 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
NovaCookies infrastructure expanded sharply from mid-May 2026, supporting a commercial adversary-in-the-middle phishing service targeting Microsoft 365 sessions.
Island researchers reported that NovaCookies sells turnkey adversary-in-the-middle phishing infrastructure that relays Microsoft 365 authentication in real time and captures authenticated session cookies, bypassing MFA. The service used at least 755 domains and targeted hundreds of organizations, including a large proportion of U.S.-connected entities.
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Researchers reported that **Forg365**, a phishing-as-a-service platform marketed through Telegram, is targeting **Microsoft 365** and other Microsoft accounts with a mix of adversary-in-the-middle phishing, **device-code phishing**, session theft, and post-compromise mailbox access. The service includes an operator panel with AI-assisted lure generation, impersonation templates for Microsoft services, SMTP rotation, campaign scheduling, token storage, and mailbox keyword monitoring, giving attackers an end-to-end workflow for credential theft and account takeover. Investigators said Forg365 can capture authentication tokens, browser cookies, and session data, while a companion browser extension, **ForgCookie**, refreshes Microsoft single sign-on cookies to preserve access without repeated reauthentication. Observed infrastructure included **Amazon SES** for email delivery, **SendGrid**-hosted resources, **Cloudflare Pages** landing pages, and **Gophish** components, alongside anti-analysis measures such as bot detection, debugger traps, sandbox checks, encrypted redirectors, and VPN-based benign redirection. Defenders were urged to restrict device-code authentication where possible, monitor **Microsoft Entra** logs, OAuth and Microsoft Graph activity, suspicious device registrations, and rapidly revoke sessions, refresh tokens, and OAuth access after suspected compromise.
Jul 14, 2026
Three phishing-as-a-service platforms—**Sneaky 2FA**, **EvilTokens**, and **EvilProxy**—are targeting U.S. organizations to steal Microsoft 365 credentials and authenticated access by capturing session cookies or OAuth tokens after users complete legitimate sign-ins. The kits use different methods, including adversary-in-the-middle session hijacking, abuse of Microsoft’s OAuth 2.0 device authorization flow, and reverse-proxy credential relay, allowing attackers to gain access without breaking MFA cryptographically. Researchers said **EvilTokens**, which emerged in 2026, has already been linked to compromises at more than **340 Microsoft 365 organizations** across at least seven countries, while **EvilProxy** has been used in campaigns against executives and managers at more than **100 organizations**. The campaigns show that standard MFA does not stop phishing when attackers steal the resulting authenticated session artifact instead of the password alone. **Sneaky 2FA** reportedly uses CAPTCHA gates, IP filtering, and cloned Microsoft login pages to evade detection, while the broader activity has created detection opportunities around impossible device-shift patterns, anomalous token use, and suspicious device-code prompts. Defenders are being urged to deploy **phishing-resistant MFA** such as **FIDO2/WebAuthn**, restrict or disable unnecessary device-code authentication in **Entra ID**, and closely monitor Microsoft 365 environments for unexpected MFA prompts and token abuse.
Aug 5, 2026
A wave of sophisticated phishing campaigns is targeting organizations globally to steal Microsoft 365 credentials by bypassing traditional email security gateways and multi-factor authentication (MFA) protections. Attackers are employing advanced techniques such as multi-stage payload delivery using nested PDF attachments, legitimate content delivery networks, and mouse tracking to evade detection. Once victims interact with these emails and enter their credentials on a credential harvesting site, attackers leverage legitimate Microsoft infrastructure to bypass MFA and gain immediate access to the victim’s Microsoft 365 environment. These campaigns are engineered to filter out security analysts and block standard security tools, making detection and response more challenging. In parallel, threat actors are increasingly using attacker-in-the-middle toolkits like Evilginx and hybrid phishing-as-a-service kits such as Salty2FA and Tycoon2FA to capture both user credentials and session cookies. By stealing session cookies, attackers can impersonate users and maintain access without triggering additional MFA prompts, even after successful authentication. The blending of different phishing kits into hybrid strains is making detection harder, as traditional security rules tuned to individual kits are now being evaded. Security researchers warn that static indicators are no longer sufficient, and behavioral analysis is required to spot these evolving threats.
Jun 29, 2026