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Elastic Security Labs identified PIPEDANCE, a previously unknown Windows backdoor used in an intrusion against a Vietnamese organization. The malware uses encrypted Windows named-pipe communications for command and control, enabling interactive command execution, host and process discovery, file operations, network-egress testing, lateral movement, and deployment of additional implants. Its RC4 encryption key is derived from a hard-coded pipe name, complicating inspection of its local interprocess communications.
During the intrusion, PIPEDANCE appeared alongside Cobalt Strike, which was injected into the legitimate openfiles.exe utility following execution involving DbgView.exe, makecab.exe, and typeperf.exe. The backdoor supports process injection through thread-execution hijacking and Heaven's Gate techniques. Elastic released behavioral detections, a hunting query, a YARA rule, and a PIPEDANCE emulation client that defenders can use in controlled environments to validate endpoint telemetry, detections, network analysis, and prevention controls.
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Elastic Security Labs observed the previously unknown PIPEDANCE Windows backdoor in a previously monitored environment targeting a Vietnamese organization. The intrusion also involved a chain from DbgView.exe through makecab.exe and typeperf.exe, culminating in Cobalt Strike injected into openfiles.exe.
Elastic Security Labs released a client application that interacts with and emulates PIPEDANCE functionality, enabling defenders to validate telemetry, detections, network analysis, and prevention controls in a lab. The accompanying repository includes behavioral detections, YARA rules, and hunting rules.
Elastic documented PIPEDANCE as a post-compromise and lateral-movement backdoor using RC4-encrypted Windows named-pipe communications, discovery commands, file operations, egress checks, and process injection. It published behavioral detections, a hunting query, and the Windows_Trojan_PipeDance YARA rule.
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