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Google integrated a memory-safe Rust DNS parser into Pixel 10 cellular-modem firmware, moving a remotely exposed, complex input-processing component out of C/C++. The implementation uses the open-source hickory-proto library, which Google helped extend with no_std support for bare-metal environments, and connects it to the existing modem codebase through FFI. The added code consumes about 371 KB, a tradeoff Google accepted because modem memory capacity was not a limiting constraint.
The change addresses a historically high-risk attack surface: Project Zero previously disclosed multiple Exynos modem vulnerabilities, including internet-to-baseband remote-code-execution flaws affecting Pixel devices. Google has separately expanded Pixel baseband defenses with bounds and integer-overflow sanitizers, stack canaries, control-flow integrity, automatic stack-variable initialization, and fuzzing or sanitizer-based testing. Its firmware guidance promotes incremental Rust adoption—particularly for parsers handling untrusted data—as a practical way to reduce memory-safety exposure without rewriting entire low-level codebases.
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5 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
Google integrated a memory-safe Rust DNS parser based on hickory-proto into Pixel 10 cellular modem firmware. The deployment required upstream no_std support and C/C++ interoperability through FFI to reduce memory-safety risk in remotely exposed DNS processing.
Google stated that the Pixel 9 family shipped with its most hardened baseband to date, including Bounds Sanitizer, Integer Overflow Sanitizer, stack canaries, Control Flow Integrity, stack zero-initialization, and pre-release testing tools.
Google's Android team described using Rust incrementally in existing low-level and bare-metal firmware, prioritizing high-risk components that process untrusted input rather than requiring full rewrites.
Google described efforts to harden cellular basebands in Android, addressing a security-sensitive firmware attack surface.
Google Project Zero reported multiple vulnerabilities enabling remote code execution from the internet against Exynos modem basebands.
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Google said the **Pixel 10** modem firmware now includes a memory-safe **Rust** DNS parser, marking the first time a Pixel device has used a memory-safe language inside its cellular baseband. The company said the change is intended to reduce memory-safety flaws in a component that processes untrusted remote data and has a broad remote attack surface, citing prior Project Zero research that demonstrated remote code execution against Pixel modems over the Internet. To build the feature, Google adapted the open-source `hickory-proto` crate for bare-metal use by adding `no_std` support and integrated it into the modem’s existing C/C++ firmware environment with **`rustc`**, **Pigweed**, **GN**, and FFI. Engineers reused the modem’s allocator and crash-handling systems and resolved linker-driven performance regressions after `compiler_builtins` conflicted with modem-optimized `memset` and `memcpy` routines, ultimately stripping those builtins from the Rust static library before linking. Google said the work extends earlier modem hardening in Pixel 9 and lays the groundwork for broader Rust adoption across baseband components.
Jun 29, 2026
Google has reported a significant reduction in memory safety vulnerabilities in Android, attributing this improvement to the adoption of the Rust programming language. According to Google, the proportion of memory safety bugs in Android has dropped below 20% for the first time, with Rust code demonstrating a 1000x reduction in vulnerability density compared to C and C++. The transition to Rust has also led to operational benefits, such as a lower rollback rate and faster code review cycles, and Google plans to expand Rust's use to additional components of the Android ecosystem, including the kernel, firmware, and key applications. Security experts emphasize that secure coding should focus on principles like secure by default and secure by design, rather than simply identifying vulnerabilities. The integration of Rust into Android's codebase exemplifies how adopting memory-safe languages can serve as a practical application of these secure coding principles, reducing the burden on developers and improving overall software security. Google's experience also highlights the importance of a defense-in-depth approach, as even memory-safe languages like Rust can have vulnerabilities if unsafe code is used, as demonstrated by the discovery and patching of a buffer overflow in the CrabbyAVIF parser before public release.
Jun 29, 2026
Google released its September 2026 Pixel security update to fix **CVE-2026-58704**, an actively exploited zero-day in the cellular modem component. Google said exploitation is limited and targeted; the improper-authorization flaw can allow a nearby attacker with basic device privileges to bypass access controls and elevate privileges without user interaction. The update addresses 110 Pixel vulnerabilities overall, including dozens rated critical or high severity. Organizations and users should deploy the `2026-09-05` Android security patch level or later across supported Pixel devices, prioritizing people and fleets at heightened risk of targeted surveillance.
Sep 18, 2026