A phishing campaign is targeting YouTube creators with personalized sponsorship offers impersonating brands including Hollyland, Nike, and Spotify. Attackers negotiate collaboration rates before directing creators to fraudulent partnership platforms that retrieve public YouTube channel information and display campaign metrics, income calculators, and purported contract and payment features to build credibility. The platforms then steer victims toward Google sign-in: fraudulent login pages can capture passwords and one-time codes, while excessive permissions granted through genuine authentication could expose channel-management capabilities.
One victim reported that attackers took over her Google account and changed recovery details and backup codes to obstruct recovery. Shared website code, branding elements, and functionality across changing domains suggest a modular campaign targeting creators internationally. Creators and organizations managing YouTube channels should independently verify sponsorship offers through official brand contacts, scrutinize sign-in destinations and requested permissions, and treat a polished partnership portal or accurate channel information as insufficient proof of legitimacy.

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7 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
AndaSeat warned about sponsorship offers involving Creoventura at creoventura[.]com and explicitly denied any affiliation or partnership with the agency. The denial contradicted the website’s claimed brand relationships, which also listed Hollyland and Maono.
ESET’s analysis identified shared functionality, favicons, meta descriptions, and source-code components across the fraudulent platforms, alongside variants impersonating Nike and Spotify. It also described counterfeit Google login pages that can steal passwords and one-time codes, distinguishing them from genuine authentication flows that may request excessive permissions.
Hollyland issued a public warning about attackers impersonating the company in sponsorship offers to creators.
The campaign’s domains and names changed repeatedly between June and August, although the source does not specify the year. Variants included Scouty-branded platforms and matchyjoin[.]com, which retrieved public channel information and redirected targets to a Google login page.
A creator reported losing control of her Google account after falling for a version of the sponsorship scam. Attackers replaced her phone number and recovery email and added their own backup codes to obstruct recovery.
After the journalist replied with her rates, the attacker directed her to joinmatchy[.]com/hollyland. The sender claimed the site would verify channel performance and handle the agreement and payment.
A sender calling herself “Brandi” and claiming to represent Hollyland’s Creator Partnerships team emailed a journalist in Peru. The message referenced specific YouTube videos and offered a device and potential long-term collaboration, but came from a domain unrelated to Hollyland.
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