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Marbled Dust Exploits Output Messenger Zero-Day for Espionage Against Kurdish Military Users

Active Exploitation · 5 sources · Updated 1mo ago · First seen Feb 5, 2019

Marbled Dust Exploits Output Messenger Zero-Day for Espionage Against Kurdish Military Users

The Türkiye-affiliated espionage group Marbled Dust, also known as Sea Turtle, Teal Kurma, and Cosmic Wolf, exploited Output Messenger vulnerability CVE-2025-27920 since April 2024 to target users in Iraq associated with the Kurdish military, Microsoft reported. The authenticated directory traversal flaw in Output Messenger Server Manager allowed attackers to place malicious files in the server startup directory, enabling persistence, data theft, and user impersonation. The campaign deployed malicious scripts and a custom Go backdoor, with some payloads using api.wordinfos[.]com for command and control and exfiltration. Microsoft assessed that the actor may have obtained prerequisite credentials through DNS hijacking or typo-squatted domains; the initial credential-acquisition method was not confirmed. Vendor Srimax released patches for CVE-2025-27920 and CVE-2025-27921, although Microsoft had not observed exploitation of the latter.

The campaign represents an increase in technical sophistication for an actor whose espionage operations date to at least 2017. Cisco Talos documented earlier DNS hijacking and credential interception affecting at least 40 organizations across 13 countries; PwC subsequently detailed the group's SnappyTCP Linux/Unix implant and targeting of government, telecommunications, IT, NGO, and media organizations. A separate cloud intrusion involved stolen credentials and security-group changes permitting direct SSH access, but the provider, credential-theft method, and any exfiltration were not confirmed. Organizations should prioritize Output Messenger patching, investigate unexpected startup files and traffic to the reported command-and-control domain, and rotate compromised credentials. Defenses should also include DNS and registrar-account protections, MFA, cloud API monitoring, and reversal of unauthorized SSH access.

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Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

15 events · Jan 2017 – Apr 2024
  1. Reported May 12, 20252y ago

    Microsoft reveals Output Messenger exploit chain and Go backdoors

    Microsoft disclosed the campaign's server and client attack chains, including OMServerService.exe and OMClientService.exe backdoors communicating with api.wordinfos[.]com for exfiltration and tasking. Microsoft attributed the operation to Türkiye-affiliated Marbled Dust and assessed it as a notable increase in the actor's technical sophistication.

    Marbled Dust leverages zero-day in Output Messenger for regional espionage
  2. Reported May 12, 20252y ago

    Srimax releases Output Messenger security patches

    Srimax released patches for CVE-2025-27920 and a second vulnerability, CVE-2025-27921, including Windows version 2.0.63 and Server version 2.0.62. Microsoft had not observed exploitation of CVE-2025-27921.

    Marbled Dust leverages zero-day in Output Messenger for regional espionage
  3. Reported May 12, 20252y ago

    Microsoft notifies Srimax of Output Messenger vulnerability

    Microsoft notified Output Messenger developer Srimax about CVE-2025-27920, the authenticated directory traversal flaw used in Marbled Dust's espionage campaign.

    Marbled Dust leverages zero-day in Output Messenger for regional espionage
  4. Apr 2024

    Marbled Dust begins exploiting Output Messenger zero-day

    Microsoft observed Marbled Dust exploiting the directory traversal vulnerability CVE-2025-27920 since April 2024 against users associated with the Kurdish military in Iraq. The campaign placed malicious files in server startup directories and deployed Go backdoors for covert access and data theft.

    Marbled Dust leverages zero-day in Output Messenger for regional espionage
  5. 2023

    CrowdStrike reports Cosmic Wolf intrusion into a technology company's cloud

    CrowdStrike's 2023 Cloud Risk Report described Cosmic Wolf using stolen credentials to target a technology company's cloud data and changing security group settings through a command-line interface to permit direct SSH access. The underlying report did not identify the cloud provider or confirm data exfiltration.

    Sea Turtle Threat Profile: Tactics & Defenses | Invictus Incident Response
  6. 2023

    Sea Turtle is observed deploying a custom Linux/Unix implant

    Sea Turtle was observed deploying a custom Linux/Unix implant in 2023. PwC analyzed the group's SnappyTCP reverse shell, which supports plaintext and TLS-secured command-and-control communications and is used for persistence.

    Sea Turtle Threat Profile: Tactics & Defenses | Invictus Incident Response
  7. 2022

    Greek CERT references Teal Kurma activity in an alert

    A Greek CERT alert referenced Teal Kurma's infrastructure and activity.

    The Tortoise and The Malwahare
  8. 2021

    Sea Turtle shifts toward credential and vulnerability exploitation

    By 2021, Sea Turtle had shifted toward exploiting exposed credentials and known vulnerabilities to compromise internet service providers and related infrastructure. The actor used compromised provider infrastructure to reach downstream victims.

    Sea Turtle Threat Profile: Tactics & Defenses | Invictus Incident Response
  9. Reported Apr 17, 20198y ago

    Talos identifies Sea Turtle and publishes campaign findings

    Cisco Talos named the campaign Sea Turtle and assessed with high confidence that an advanced, state-sponsored actor conducted it independently of DNSpionage. Its report detailed DNS manipulation, man-in-the-middle credential harvesting, certificate abuse, and campaign indicators.

    DNS Hijacking Abuses Trust In Core Internet Service
  10. Reported Apr 17, 20198y ago

    Root DNS operators report no evidence of root-zone compromise

    Root DNS server operators issued a joint statement reporting no signs of compromised root-zone integrity or unexpected responses to clients. Talos likewise found no evidence that root-zone servers were attacked or compromised in the campaign.

    DNS Hijacking Abuses Trust In Core Internet Service
  11. Reported Apr 17, 20198y ago

    Sea Turtle targets Cafax following the NetNod compromise

    Talos described subsequent targeting of Swedish consulting firm Cafax, assessing that the attackers likely sought to re-establish access to NetNod.

    DNS Hijacking Abuses Trust In Core Internet Service
  12. Feb 5, 20198y ago

    NetNod publicly acknowledges compromise

    NetNod acknowledged a compromise associated with the campaign. Talos reported that attackers manipulated DNS records for sa1.dnsnode.net to harvest administrator credentials for domains under Saudi Arabia's .sa top-level domain.

    DNS Hijacking Abuses Trust In Core Internet Service
  13. Jan 24, 20198y ago

    DHS warns about DNS redirection and fraudulent certificates

    The U.S. Department of Homeland Security issued an alert warning that attackers could redirect organizational traffic and obtain valid encryption certificates for victim domains.

    DNS Hijacking Abuses Trust In Core Internet Service
  14. Jan 4, 20198y ago

    Packet Clearing House discloses DNS hijacking

    Packet Clearing House publicly revealed that its internal DNS had been briefly hijacked following a compromise at its domain registrar.

    DNS Hijacking Abuses Trust In Core Internet Service
  15. Jan 2017

    Sea Turtle begins DNS-hijacking espionage campaign

    Talos assessed that the campaign likely began in January 2017, compromising DNS providers and redirecting victim traffic to attacker-controlled infrastructure to steal credentials. Talos documented at least 40 compromised organizations across 13 countries through the first quarter of 2019; other sources describe DNS-hijacking activity continuing through 2020.

    DNS Hijacking Abuses Trust In Core Internet Service
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Threat actors

2 linked

Affected products

1 linked
Output Messenger

Organizations

1 linked
Teal Kurma

Observables

118 linked

Indicator values are masked on this page. View all 118 in Mallory Domains, IPs, hashes, and URLs are exportable to your SIEM.

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