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EstateRansomware Attack Used Dormant VPN Account and Suspected Veeam Exploitation

Threat Actor Intelligence · 1 source · Updated 1mo ago · First seen Jul 10, 2024

EstateRansomware Attack Used Dormant VPN Account and Suspected Veeam Exploitation

Group-IB investigated an EstateRansomware attack in April 2024 that began through a dormant FortiGate SSL VPN account. The attacker installed a persistent backdoor on a failover server, moved laterally using Remote Desktop Protocol, and likely exploited CVE-2023-27532 in unpatched Veeam Backup & Replication software. Available logs did not conclusively establish successful exploitation, but investigators observed SQL Server command execution being enabled and a rogue account being created shortly after exploitation-related activity.

The attacker used network discovery and credential recovery tools to expand access, disabled Windows Defender, and deployed EstateRansomware through PsExec. The ransomware encrypted data and cleared Windows event logs on affected servers and workstations. The incident highlights the need to disable dormant VPN accounts, patch backup infrastructure, and monitor for unauthorized accounts, unexpected SQL Server command execution, and remote administrative tool use.

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Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

12 events · Mar 2023 – Apr 2024
  1. Reported Jul 10, 20242y ago

    VPN brute-force attempts target dormant Acc1 account

    Brute-force attempts against the dormant FortiGate SSL VPN account Acc1 preceded a successful attacker login by several days.

    Patch or Peril: A Veeam vulnerability incident | Group-IB Blog
  2. Apr 2024

    EstateRansomware encrypts systems and clears Windows event logs

    EstateRansomware encrypted data on affected servers and workstations and cleared essential Windows event logs, impeding detection and forensic investigation.

    Patch or Peril: A Veeam vulnerability incident | Group-IB Blog
  3. Apr 2024

    EstateRansomware deployed through PsExec

    The attacker staged the EstateRansomware executable LB3.exe and PsExec.exe in C:\PerfLogs. Investigators observed installation of the PSEXESVC service followed by ransomware execution and ransom-note creation.

    Patch or Peril: A Veeam vulnerability incident | Group-IB Blog
  4. Apr 2024

    Windows Defender disabled on accessed hosts

    The attacker disabled Windows Defender on accessed systems and used Defender Control, named DC.exe, to maintain its deactivation.

    Patch or Peril: A Veeam vulnerability incident | Group-IB Blog
  5. Apr 2024

    Compromised domain accounts enable wider lateral movement

    The attacker used compromised domain accounts to move from the Active Directory server to additional servers and workstations.

    Patch or Peril: A Veeam vulnerability incident | Group-IB Blog
  6. Apr 2024

    Attacker reaches Active Directory server and enumerates domain users

    The attacker accessed the Active Directory server through RDP, downloaded AdFind, and used it to enumerate domain users.

    Patch or Peril: A Veeam vulnerability incident | Group-IB Blog
  7. Apr 2024

    Network discovery and credential harvesting expand attacker access

    The attacker used SoftPerfect NetScan and NirSoft password recovery tools on the file server to discover hosts, ports, and shares and harvest credentials. Additional credential harvesting took place on the backup server through the newly created VeeamBkp account.

    Patch or Peril: A Veeam vulnerability incident | Group-IB Blog
  8. Apr 2024

    Suspected Veeam exploitation precedes shell access and rogue account creation

    A crash involving CVE-2023-27532.exe occurred on the backup server at 18:54:50; access to VeeamHax followed at 18:55:31, and xp_cmdshell activation and VeeamBkp account creation occurred at 18:55:51. Group-IB assessed that exploitation likely enabled these changes, but available logs could not conclusively confirm successful exploitation.

    Patch or Peril: A Veeam vulnerability incident | Group-IB Blog
  9. Apr 2024

    Attacker moves to file server and stages Veeam exploitation tools

    The following day, the attacker moved from the failover server to the file server through RDP and pursued credential harvesting and Veeam exploitation. Investigators found veeam-creds-main, CVE-2023-27532.exe, and VeeamHax artifacts, along with a PowerShell record showing intent to execute veeam-creds-main.

    Patch or Peril: A Veeam vulnerability incident | Group-IB Blog
  10. Apr 2024

    Persistent reverse-tunnel backdoor installed on failover server

    The attacker installed svchost.exe and configured a scheduled task to execute it daily, establishing an HTTP reverse tunnel to 77.238.245[.]11:30001. The attacker then disconnected from the VPN and used the backdoor for subsequent access, with no further VPN logins observed.

    Patch or Peril: A Veeam vulnerability incident | Group-IB Blog
  11. Apr 2024

    Attacker gains network access through FortiGate SSL VPN

    The attacker successfully authenticated as Acc1 from 149.28.106[.]252 and established April VPN connections from three United States IP addresses. An existing RDP bookmark allowed access to the failover server without additional credentials.

    Patch or Peril: A Veeam vulnerability incident | Group-IB Blog
  12. Mar 2023

    Veeam discloses CVE-2023-27532 and releases patches

    CVE-2023-27532 was publicly disclosed, and Veeam issued patches for Backup & Replication versions 12 and 11a.

    Patch or Peril: A Veeam vulnerability incident | Group-IB Blog
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Threat actors

1 linked

Malware

1 linked

Affected products

2 linked
FortigateVeeam Backup & Replication

Observables

8 linked

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