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nDiligence Reports Runtime Rendering Supply-Chain Risks Across 50 Platform Types

Supply Chain Risk · 4 sources · Updated 5d ago · First seen Nov 12, 2026

nDiligence Reports Runtime Rendering Supply-Chain Risks Across 50 Platform Types

nDiligence released Attack the Glass (ATG), a four-year study reporting supply-chain vulnerabilities in runtime client-side rendering across all 50 software and device types examined, with 46 rated Critical or High risk. According to the company, compromising a supplier of code, data or media can allow attackers to manipulate an application's display and behavior, capture user input and act with the user's authority after initial security checks.

The research cites the 2024 Polyfill.io compromise as an example of the underlying supply-chain threat. It also outlines potential consequences for news, elections, military decision-making and critical infrastructure, but does not document confirmed attacks against those sectors. nDiligence published a whitepaper, demonstrations and remediation playbooks after reportedly briefing governments privately for more than two years, providing resources for security teams to assess runtime third-party dependencies.

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Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

6 events · 2024 – Nov 12, 2026
  1. Reported Nov 12, 20265d ago

    nDiligence privately briefs governments on Attack the Glass

    nDiligence says its team privately briefed governments about the research for more than two years before publication because of security concerns.

    nDiligence Releases Four-Year Study Identifying a Critical Supply-Chain Vulnerability Across 50 Platform Types
  2. Reported Nov 12, 20265d ago

    U.S. Treasury sanctions the company that acquired Polyfill.io

    According to nDiligence's announcement, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned the company that acquired the Polyfill.io domain after its February 2024 purchase. The sources do not specify the sanctions date.

    nDiligence Releases Four-Year Study Identifying a Critical Supply-Chain Vulnerability Across 50 Platform Types
  3. Nov 12, 20265d ago

    nDiligence publicly releases Attack the Glass research and remediation materials

    nDiligence released its four-year study of runtime client-side rendering risks, reporting vulnerabilities in all 50 software and device types examined and Critical or High risk ratings for 46. The release included a sixteen-chapter whitepaper, twenty online demonstrations and remediation playbooks made freely shareable under TLP:CLEAR.

    nDiligence Releases Four-Year Study Identifying a Critical Supply-Chain Vulnerability Across 50 Platform Types
  4. Jun 2024

    Researchers discover altered Polyfill.io code

    Researchers discovered the Polyfill.io supply-chain compromise in June 2024, after altered code had reportedly run on website visitors' devices for months. nDiligence later cited the incident as an example of malicious supplier code reaching users through legitimate websites.

    nDiligence Releases Four-Year Study Identifying a Critical Supply-Chain Vulnerability Across 50 Platform Types
  5. Feb 2024

    Polyfill.io domain sold to a new owner

    According to nDiligence's announcement, the domain behind Polyfill.io was sold to a company in February 2024. The library supplied code to more than 100,000 websites.

    nDiligence Releases Four-Year Study Identifying a Critical Supply-Chain Vulnerability Across 50 Platform Types
  6. 2024

    nDiligence begins working with researchers, vendors and governments on mitigations

    Robert Beckett says nDiligence began working with researchers, vendors and governments in 2024 to identify ways to address the supply-chain security gap described in its Attack the Glass research.

    nDiligence Releases Four-Year Study Identifying a Critical Supply-Chain Vulnerability Across 50 Platform Types
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