SilentAir Abuses Compromised Asian Telcos to Intercept Taiwanese Calls and Texts
Sector Threat Intelligence · 21 sources · Updated 6h ago · First seen Nov 12, 2026

Enea identified SilentAir, an actor using compromised Asian mobile operators to intercept calls and text messages, primarily targeting Taiwanese subscribers. The activity exploited SS7 and Diameter signaling, with some interceptions associated with the arrival of two-factor authentication codes, suggesting attempts to compromise victims’ other accounts. Enea assessed with high confidence that SilentAir operates at state level, but linked it to China-nexus operations only with low confidence; a possible connection to Liminal Panda remains unproven.
Separately, Enea detected Liminal Panda at multiple operators and identified a new GTPDoor backdoor variant that hides command-and-control traffic within GTP-U user-data traffic. CrowdStrike previously documented Liminal Panda targeting telecommunications providers since at least 2020, using custom tools to collect subscriber information, call metadata and SMS messages, and leveraging compromised telecom servers to penetrate other providers. Enea reported helping customers remove Liminal Panda and notifying operators hosting SilentAir attack sources, but warned that conditions enabling renewed activity remained. Operators should prioritize signaling-abuse detection, scrutiny of GTP-U traffic and investigation of cross-provider access paths.


