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Gentlemen Ransomware Deployment Falters; EtherRAT Infrastructure Links Two Intrusions

Threat Actor Intelligence · 2 sources · Updated 4d ago · First seen Sep 22, 2026

Gentlemen Ransomware Deployment Falters; EtherRAT Infrastructure Links Two Intrusions

A Gentlemen ransomware affiliate breached a small company through an SSL-VPN account without multifactor authentication in August 2026 and obtained Domain Admin privileges in under an hour, Ransom-ISAC reported. Investigators assess that credentials were probably extracted from an obsolete Windows Server 2003 host. The attacker deployed a previously unmatched Rust credential harvester and EtherRAT, stole system and browser secrets, and exfiltrated data through the VPN over approximately two days. A likely Active Directory replication race prevented the ransomware deployment Group Policy Object from registering its scheduled-task extension, limiting encryption to one domain controller even though antivirus-disable settings applied across the estate. EtherRAT used an Ethereum smart contract to resolve command-and-control infrastructure, but investigators found no evidence that the installed implants contacted it.

Shared infrastructure suggests the same operator probably conducted a separate September intrusion into a Deception.Pro Active Directory honeynet through a KongTuke ClickFix lure. That 289-hour operation deployed a Node.js backdoor assessed as EtherRAT, which queried public Ethereum RPC providers for rotating command-and-control infrastructure and subsequently downloaded tooling. Operators performed credential theft, reconnaissance, tunneling, screen capture, and TLS-based data staging and exfiltration before deploying AdaptixC2 and SystemBC, enabling RDP, and establishing persistence through VBS and scheduled tasks. Deception.Pro assessed the activity as ransomware prepositioning, not a confirmed ransomware deployment. SystemBC usage and other on-chain overlaps do not independently establish common attribution. The incidents underscore the importance of VPN MFA, retiring unsupported servers, and detecting credential theft and malicious Group Policy changes before encryption begins.

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Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

21 events · Jul 15, 2026 – Sep 22, 2026
  1. Reported Nov 13, 20265d ago

    Shared infrastructure links the August and September intrusions

    Investigators identified the same EtherRAT contract and 77[.]91.123.131 in both intrusions, supporting a probable common operator while treating KongTuke as a separate access supplier. They judged other on-chain overlaps insufficient to establish attribution to another actor.

    The Gentlemen Incident: Locked Out | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  2. Reported Nov 13, 20265d ago

    Locker analysis identifies changes that defeat memory-based recovery

    Analysis of the recovered Gentlemen Go locker found per-file X25519 key agreement and XChaCha20 encryption. This build zeroed ephemeral private keys and derived material, defeating a previously published memory-based recovery method.

    The Gentlemen Incident: Locked Out | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  3. Reported Nov 13, 20265d ago

    Investigators document a previously unmatched Rust credential harvester

    Investigators found no known public match for the recovered harvester, which combined system-secret extraction, DPAPI recovery, and browser credential theft. Analysis showed it could bypass browser App-Bound v20 protection using system CNG key unwrapping and browser-token impersonation.

    The Gentlemen Incident: Locked Out | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  4. Reported Nov 13, 20265d ago

    Gentlemen claims responsibility for the small-company attack

    A responsibility claim supported attribution of the August attack to Gentlemen, alongside README-GENTLEMEN.txt ransom notes, GENTLEMEN file footers, and the .470k2z extension.

    The Gentlemen Incident: Locked Out | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  5. Sep 22, 20262mo ago

    Persistent beaconing continues through the end of honeynet observation

    SystemBC beaconing and persistent remote access continued through September 22. The observed intrusion spanned approximately 289 hours beginning on September 10.

    [Op Report] KongTuke ClickFix to SystemBC: HoK Intrusion - Deception.Pro Blog
  6. Sep 15, 20262mo ago

    AdaptixC2 and SystemBC expand persistent remote access

    Operators deployed AdaptixC2 and SystemBC, re-enabled RDP, and established persistence through VBS files and scheduled tasks. An AdaptixC2 agent delivered as connect.msi and MSI8FD.tmp began high-volume HTTP beaconing to 187[.]77.30.227:5005.

    [Op Report] KongTuke ClickFix to SystemBC: HoK Intrusion - Deception.Pro Blog
  7. Sep 14, 20262mo ago

    Operators perform interactive host and network reconnaissance

    The operators ran systeminfo, route print, arp -a, and nltest /dclist to inspect the compromised host, network configuration, and domain controllers.

    [Op Report] KongTuke ClickFix to SystemBC: HoK Intrusion - Deception.Pro Blog
  8. Sep 13, 20262mo ago

    Operators download Chisel and establish additional beaconing

    The operators downloaded Chisel from 77[.]91.123.131:8000 and used Go HTTP client beaconing to 85[.]113.71.20.

    [Op Report] KongTuke ClickFix to SystemBC: HoK Intrusion - Deception.Pro Blog
  9. Sep 11, 20262mo ago

    Operators create a local administrator account

    The operators created an account named user1 and added it to the local Administrators group.

    [Op Report] KongTuke ClickFix to SystemBC: HoK Intrusion - Deception.Pro Blog
  10. Sep 10, 20262mo ago

    KongTuke ClickFix lure initiates a honeynet intrusion

    A fake-verification lure initiated an intrusion into a Deception.Pro Active Directory honeynet using a hidden conhost --headless command. The delivery chain downloaded Node.js runtimes and launched a backdoor assessed as EtherRAT.

    [Op Report] KongTuke ClickFix to SystemBC: HoK Intrusion - Deception.Pro Blog
  11. Sep 2026

    Operators establish reverse tunnels and capture the desktop

    During the honeynet intrusion, operators established a reverse SSH SOCKS tunnel to 77[.]91.123.131 and used ffmpeg with gdigrab for desktop screen-capture streaming. They also retrieved a separate proxy or relay payload named win.exe.

    [Op Report] KongTuke ClickFix to SystemBC: HoK Intrusion - Deception.Pro Blog
  12. Sep 2026

    Honeynet operators steal credentials and prepare lateral movement

    During the September intrusion, operators exported the SAM hive, dumped LSASS, and performed pass-the-hash, NTLM relay, Kerberos, and token-abuse activity. They also scanned internal SMB services and attempted brute-force authentication.

    [Op Report] KongTuke ClickFix to SystemBC: HoK Intrusion - Deception.Pro Blog
  13. Sep 2026

    Cloudflare tunnels accompany substantial TLS data transfers

    Between September 11 and 12, operators established Cloudflare Tunnel infrastructure using cloudflared.exe, trycloudflare, and argotunnel. The activity coincided with sustained TLS uploads, with staging or exfiltration volumes progressing from 50 MB to 1–5 GB or more.

    [Op Report] KongTuke ClickFix to SystemBC: HoK Intrusion - Deception.Pro Blog
  14. Aug 2026

    Gentlemen deployment encrypts only one domain controller

    The attacker staged the locker in NETLOGON and created an enforced GPO to disable antivirus and launch a SYSTEM scheduled task. A likely Active Directory replication race prevented scheduled-task extension registration, so antivirus disabling applied estate-wide but only one domain controller was encrypted.

    The Gentlemen Incident: Locked Out | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  15. Aug 2026

    Company data is exfiltrated through the VPN over approximately two days

    The attacker transferred data through the SSL-VPN at approximately 1 MB per second, using 77[.]91.123.131 for bulk exfiltration. Repeated reconnections bypassed the appliance's eight-hour session limit.

    The Gentlemen Incident: Locked Out | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  16. Aug 2026

    Attacker installs EtherRAT persistence on two servers

    The attacker installed EtherRAT components on two servers, including a domain controller, using a PowerShell loader and disguised encrypted files. Firewall records and implant state showed no successful contact with EtherRAT infrastructure during the four-day evidence window; investigators considered nonexecution the most likely explanation.

    The Gentlemen Incident: Locked Out | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  17. Aug 2026

    Rust credential harvester steals secrets across dozens of hosts

    Running as Domain Admin, a Rust harvester deployed as buildE.exe accessed dozens of hosts and copied browser login databases, system secrets, and DPAPI material. Its collection of the domain DPAPI backup key enabled continued decryption of affected users' secrets despite password resets.

    The Gentlemen Incident: Locked Out | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  18. Aug 2026

    Attacker gains Domain Admin access within an hour

    The attacker accessed a dormant local administrator account with a weak password on a VPN-reachable Windows Server 2003 SQL host. Investigators considered extraction of Domain Admin secrets from that host the most likely escalation mechanism, but could not prove it.

    The Gentlemen Incident: Locked Out | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  19. Aug 2026

    Attacker conducts SMB discovery and unsuccessful credential attacks

    Seconds after connecting, the attacker conducted an anonymous SMB sweep, followed by an unsuccessful Kerberos encryption-downgrade attempt against a privileged account. Hundreds of failed SMB authentication attempts were also observed, but investigators found no role for them in the successful escalation.

    The Gentlemen Incident: Locked Out | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  20. Aug 2026

    Gentlemen affiliate breaches a small company through an unprotected VPN account

    In early August, an attacker accessed an unnamed small company's SSL-VPN using an account without MFA, succeeding on the first authentication attempt. Investigators assessed that the credentials were probably acquired before the intrusion.

    The Gentlemen Incident: Locked Out | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  21. Jul 15, 20264mo ago

    EtherRAT operator wallet receives cryptocurrency funding

    The EtherRAT operator wallet received 0.00770777 ETH from a ChangeNOW-attributed payout wallet. Investigators assessed a further upstream funding association as probable rather than proven.

    The Gentlemen Incident: Locked Out | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
Linked entities

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Threat actors

1 linked

Malware

2 linked

Affected products

3 linked
WindowsWindows Server 2003Chrome

Organizations

1 linked
Deception.Pro

Observables

56 linked

Indicator values are masked on this page. View all 56 in Mallory Domains, IPs, hashes, and URLs are exportable to your SIEM.

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