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Mustang Panda-Linked Campaign Delivers LOTUSLITE V2 via Zoho WorkDrive

Threat Actor Intelligence · 3 sources · Updated 12h ago · First seen Nov 16, 2026

Mustang Panda-Linked Campaign Delivers LOTUSLITE V2 via Zoho WorkDrive

Hackers linked to Mustang Panda are distributing LOTUSLITE V2 in a Thailand-focused espionage campaign using public Zoho WorkDrive downloads and an Indo-Pacific assessment lure. Victims must execute a file from the downloaded archive, initiating an infection chain that abuses a legitimate PDFgear executable to sideload a malicious DLL. The campaign establishes persistence through registry entries and a modified file association. It abuses WorkDrive as a delivery service rather than exploiting a Zoho vulnerability.

Antares Research identified the implant as a managed C# successor to LOTUSLITE, with hardcoded command-and-control servers, updated protocol identifiers, and application-layer AES-256-GCM encryption. Detection signatures targeting older LOTUSLITE protocol markers may miss the new version. Defenders should correlate unexpected PDFgear execution with suspicious DLL loading, registry and file-association changes, and outbound connections rather than relying solely on legacy network signatures.

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Event timeline

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3 events · Nov 15, 2026
  1. Reported Nov 16, 20261d ago

    Mustang Panda-linked campaign distributes LOTUSLITE V2 to targets in Thailand

    A campaign linked to Mustang Panda distributed LOTUSLITE V2 through public Zoho WorkDrive downloads using an Indo-Pacific assessment lure. Running the downloaded executable initiates PDFgear-based DLL sideloading and registry persistence; the delivery abuses legitimate hosting rather than a Zoho vulnerability.

    Mustang Panda-Linked Hackers Deploy LOTUSLITE V2 Through Malicious Zoho WorkDrive Downloads | Cryptika Cybersecurity
  2. Reported Nov 16, 20261d ago

    Earlier LOTUSLITE espionage campaign targets India

    An earlier LOTUSLITE espionage campaign targeted India using a Microsoft-signed launcher, contrasting with the PDFgear execution cover used in the later Thailand-focused campaign.

    Mustang Panda-Linked Hackers Deploy LOTUSLITE V2 Through Malicious Zoho WorkDrive Downloads | Cryptika Cybersecurity
  3. Nov 15, 20263d ago

    Antares Research publishes LOTUSLITE V2 technical analysis

    Antares Research authors Kyaw Pyiyt Htet and PHYO PAING HTUN described LOTUSLITE V2 as a managed C# successor to the earlier native C++ malware, assessing its lineage with high confidence. Their analysis disclosed indicators, hardcoded command servers, an updated PRO1 protocol marker, and application-layer AES-256-GCM encryption, warning that older protocol signatures would miss the new identifier.

    Mustang Panda-Linked Hackers Deploy LOTUSLITE V2 Through Malicious Zoho WorkDrive Downloads | Cryptika Cybersecurity
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