Hickory DNSSEC Flaw Allows Forged Zone-Apex NODATA Responses to Be Accepted as Secure
Vulnerability Disclosure · 3 sources · Updated 8h ago · First seen Nov 17, 2026

A DNSSEC validation vulnerability in Hickory, tracked as CVE-2026-123600, allows forged NODATA responses at a DNS zone apex to be accepted as secure. An attacker able to answer or modify DNS responses can replay genuine signed NSEC3 and SOA records from the zone without providing an NSEC3 record matching the hashed query name. A recursive resolver may then cache the false denial of record existence for the negative TTL, suppressing legitimate DNS answers. The affected validation branch treated a query-name match with the SOA name as sufficient proof despite the missing NSEC3 match.
The flaw affects hickory-proto versions 0.25.0-alpha.3 through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and the affected DnssecDnsHandle implementation in hickory-net when built with the dnssec-ring or dnssec-aws-lc-rs feature. DNSSEC validation moved from hickory-proto to hickory-net starting in 0.26.0-beta.1; no hickory-proto release contains a fix. Affected users, including applications validating through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor, should migrate to 0.26.2 or later. The patch changes the invalid proof result from secure to bogus and adds a regression test rejecting an apex MX NODATA response whose NSEC3 record does not match the queried name.


