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Blatant-Linked Hosting Investigation Exposes Infrastructure Supporting Cybercrime

Threat Actor Intelligence · 3 sources · Updated 22m ago · First seen Nov 17, 2026

Blatant-Linked Hosting Investigation Exposes Infrastructure Supporting Cybercrime

Bridewell traced financial-institution helpdesk impersonation infrastructure to Blatant Technologies, LLC (AS403005), then mapped connections to anonymous VPS services and adjacent hosting networks. Researchers identified AnonRDP within Blatant-associated infrastructure and KittyRDP, VMHeaven and Wildservers across recurring TechTies and SkyLink hosting labels. Observed activity included CERBERUS panels spanning Blatant and TechTies, ScreenConnect deployments, Evilginx-branded interfaces, impersonation infrastructure and outbound scanning. Blatant and TechTies shared a Seychelles registration address, AS-ALEX0220 membership and observed SMARTNET connectivity, but these associations do not establish common ownership or deliberate tolerance of abuse. Historical reporting also linked prefixes subsequently associated with Blatant to Lumma command-and-control infrastructure and the TeamPCP-attributed LiteLLM compromise.

The findings align with Recorded Future’s Insikt Group review of malicious infrastructure observed during 2025, which found that high-risk hosting networks sustained operations through corporate impersonation, rebranding, routing changes and internet registry resource transfers, limiting sanctions’ effectiveness on their own. LummaC2 remained the leading infostealer command-and-control detection despite disruption, while malware delivery and ransomware operations relied on resilient, multi-tier infrastructure. Defenders should track dated prefix ownership and routing histories, prioritize service-level and behavioral indicators, enrich telemetry before escalation, and monitor infrastructure migrations after disruption rather than treating shared hosting or present-day address ownership as proof of malicious activity.

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Event timeline

How this story unfolded

Events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.

43 events · Nov 2024 – Oct 27, 2026
  1. Reported Nov 17, 202622h ago

    Exposed backend reportedly matches BYOD extortion site

    Social-media reporting identified an exposed backend at 31.56.19.34:3000 whose page reportedly matched the BYOD extortion group's onion site and displayed the same three victim cards. The reported victim compromise remained unverified.

    Blatant and Beyond | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  2. Oct 27, 202622d ago

    DOJ announces seizure of virtualine.net

    The US Department of Justice announced the seizure of virtualine[.]net, identified Omegatech as a Virtualine alias and described court-record allegations of plans to relocate criminal infrastructure after law-enforcement requests. The seizure did not establish that all associated servers were offline or implicate other routing-set members.

    Blatant and Beyond | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  3. Oct 26, 202623d ago

    GreyNoise snapshot identifies 124 scanning IPs across Blatant prefixes

    A GreyNoise snapshot reviewed on October 26 identified 124 scanning addresses across seven Blatant prefixes, including 43 classified as malicious and 22 as suspicious. Recorded behavior included SSH brute forcing, web reconnaissance, proxy discovery and exploitation attempts, without demonstrating successful compromise.

    Blatant and Beyond | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  4. Oct 23, 202626d ago

    Customer telemetry records connection from 43.228.157.208

    Customer telemetry recorded traffic from 43.228.157.208 to the previously observed customer asset on destination port 443. The connection did not by itself demonstrate compromise.

    Blatant and Beyond | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  5. Oct 2026

    Bridewell identifies additional suspected C2 and impersonation infrastructure

    The October inventory included Tripaul, Hermes, ARTEX C2 AI Framework and BTMOB V4.1 panel identifications, plus a provisional Sliver C2 identification at 46.151.182.182. Bridewell also identified Okta- and ServiceNow-themed impersonation leads at 196.251.121.218.

    Blatant and Beyond | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  6. Oct 2026

    Evilginx-branded interface leads to matching services across seven ASNs

    An Evilginx-branded interface at 196.251.121.204:8443 led Bridewell to ten matching services across seven autonomous systems. Their design and port matched the third-party zyntarvo/EVILGINX-Control-Panel project, but backend functionality was not independently verified.

    Blatant and Beyond | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  7. Oct 2026

    Bridewell identifies ScreenConnect across seven Blatant-associated prefixes

    A ScreenConnect title search returned 15 distinct addresses across seven Blatant-associated prefixes, including an October observation at 46.151.182.31. Bridewell assessed with moderate confidence that some infrastructure supported malicious remote access, while acknowledging legitimate uses and unverified delivery lures, authorization and operator actions.

    Blatant and Beyond | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  8. Oct 2026

    Bridewell finds evidence of shared Dojiner and CERBERUS development lineage

    Shared GitLab repository strings, developer paths and reuse of an Alpine Digital Solutions signing certificate supported a shared development lineage between Dojiner and CERBERUS samples. Bridewell also found dojiner[.]at resolving to 64.89.160.67, while a gaming-credential-theft role remained unconfirmed.

    Blatant and Beyond | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  9. Oct 2026

    Matching CERBERUS panels connect Blatant and TechTies infrastructure

    Bridewell identified matching CERBERUS interfaces on three Blatant addresses and TechTies address 93.152.221.216. The TechTies host used g2fali.kittyrdp[.]com and returned HTML identical to a Blatant host, providing a direct pivot into KittyRDP research.

    Blatant and Beyond | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  10. Oct 2026

    Bridewell maps anonymous hosting services and shared network associations

    Bridewell mapped AnonRDP within Blatant-associated infrastructure and identified KittyRDP, VMHeaven and Wildservers across recurring TechTies and SkyLink labels. Shared registration, routing-set and connectivity indicators between Blatant and TechTies did not establish common ownership or deliberate tolerance of abuse.

    Blatant and Beyond | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  11. Oct 2026

    Bridewell traces financial helpdesk impersonation pages to Blatant

    During a seven-day October investigation, Bridewell mapped 17 retained domain resolutions for malicious financial-institution 'Security Verification' pages to two AS403005 addresses. Sixteen resolved to 196.251.121.110, while santandergetsupport[.]com resolved to 31.56.19.115.

    Blatant and Beyond | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  12. Sep 27, 20262mo ago

    Eight former Ghosty ranges appear under Blatant

    Lupovis reported that eight of the nine ranges in Blatant's later inventory appeared under Blatant after previously being announced by Ghosty Networks and briefly by Netiface LLC. Netiface LLC is distinct from Netiface America, Inc.

    Blatant and Beyond | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  13. Sep 25, 20262mo ago

    Blatant ASN registered as BLATANTHOST

    AS403005 was registered as BLATANTHOST for Blatant Technologies, LLC. The ASN registration does not establish when the company began operating.

    Blatant and Beyond | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  14. Sep 11, 20262mo ago

    Customer telemetry records connection from 64.89.161.180

    Customer telemetry recorded traffic from 64.89.161.180 to the same customer asset on destination port 443. The observation alone did not establish compromise.

    Blatant and Beyond | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  15. Sep 9, 20262mo ago

    Customer telemetry records connection from 43.228.157.248

    Customer telemetry recorded traffic from 43.228.157.248 to a customer asset on destination port 443. A possible earlier PentAGI interface on the source address did not establish its involvement in the connection.

    Blatant and Beyond | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  16. Sep 8, 20262mo ago

    Lupovis observes malicious activity across successive hosting origins

    Lupovis reported malicious activity from 64.89.160.73 during September 8–October 7, spanning Ghosty Networks, Netiface LLC and Blatant origin periods. This continuity did not establish common ownership or uninterrupted customer control.

    Blatant and Beyond | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  17. Sep 7, 20262mo ago

    Blatant Technologies organization record registered

    The organization record for Blatant Technologies, LLC was registered. This registry date does not establish the company's incorporation or service-launch date.

    Blatant and Beyond | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  18. Jun 13, 20265mo ago

    Researcher identifies Lumma C2 on a Ghosty Networks address

    A researcher identified 64.89.160.194 as Lumma command-and-control infrastructure under Ghosty Networks AS205759. Its containing prefix later appeared under Blatant, without evidence that the historical activity continued after the routing change.

    Blatant and Beyond | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  19. May 18, 20266mo ago

    Sandbox records show Agent.vbs installing ScreenConnect

    Sandbox records dated May 18–19 showed Agent.vbs retrieving a ScreenConnect installer from 46.151.182.31 and executing it through msiexec. Later observation of ScreenConnect at the same address did not establish uninterrupted operation or a common administrator.

    Blatant and Beyond | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  20. Mar 2026

    TeamPCP-attributed LiteLLM compromise uses Ghosty-hosted exfiltration endpoint

    Published reporting attributed the LiteLLM supply-chain compromise involving malicious versions 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 to TeamPCP. The credential-exfiltration endpoint models.litellm[.]cloud was linked to 46.151.182.203 under Ghosty Networks, before the prefix appeared in Blatant's inventory.

    Blatant and Beyond | Ransom-ISAC Blog - Ransom-ISAC
  21. Jan 21, 202610mo ago

    Virtualine-associated prefixes begin shifting to Omegatech

    Prefixes associated with Virtualine Technologies began shifting to Omegatech LTD. Insikt Group reported that Virtualine also used Railnet LLC and corporate impersonation involving metaspinner net GmbH and Lanedo GmbH to sustain malicious hosting.

    Recorded Future Blog
  22. Nov 19, 20251y ago

    US, UK and Australia sanction Media Land and Yalishanda

    The United States, United Kingdom and Australia jointly sanctioned Media Land LLC and Alexander Volosovik, also known as Yalishanda.

    Recorded Future Blog
  23. Nov 12, 20251y ago

    Dutch seizure takes CrazyRDP-linked networks offline

    CrazyRDP-linked networks went offline following a Dutch law enforcement seizure associated with Operation Endgame.

    Recorded Future Blog
  24. Nov 2025

    Law enforcement targets Rhadamanthys

    Law enforcement operations targeted Rhadamanthys, preceding a sharp decline in detected command-and-control servers.

    Recorded Future Blog
  25. Oct 2025

    Three suspected Meduza Stealer developers arrested in Russia

    Three suspected Meduza Stealer developers were arrested in Russia. Insikt Group identified the arrests as a possible contributor to the malware's declining share of detected infostealer management panels.

    Recorded Future Blog
  26. May 13, 20252y ago

    International operation disrupts LummaC2

    Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit, the US Department of Justice, Europol's European Cybercrime Center and Japan's Cybercrime Control Center participated in a LummaC2 disruption operation.

    Recorded Future Blog
  27. May 2025

    Ngioweb reemerges with modified domain-generation algorithms

    Ngioweb reemerged after the November 2024 sinkholing operation and expanded its domain-generation algorithms to use additional top-level domains. Insikt Group assessed that it continued supplying the NSOCKS proxy service.

    Recorded Future Blog
  28. Mar 2025

    Insikt Group first documents CastleRAT

    Insikt Group documented CastleRAT, which used a custom RC4-encrypted binary command-and-control protocol and multiple C2 nodes. Its C and Python variants supported remote command execution, while the C variant also supported credential theft, keylogging and screen capture.

    Recorded Future Blog
  29. 2025

    DanaBot reemerges during the second half of 2025

    DanaBot reemerged during the second half of 2025, with approximately 10 to 30 active command-and-control servers observed at a time.

    Recorded Future Blog
  30. 2025

    Interlock claims 114 victims while using TAG-124 delivery infrastructure

    Interlock claimed 114 victims in 2025 and used TAG-124 traffic-distribution infrastructure to deliver deceptive installers and a PowerShell backdoor. Insikt Group observed redundant command-and-control addresses across different autonomous systems.

    Recorded Future Blog
  31. 2025

    Rhysida claims 100 victims and expands deceptive-download activity

    Rhysida claimed 100 victims during 2025 and increasingly used malvertising impersonating Microsoft Teams and Google Authenticator. CleanUpLoader was linked to malvertising-driven intrusions that delivered Rhysida ransomware.

    Recorded Future Blog
  32. 2025

    Insikt Group identifies eight Candiru-related infrastructure clusters

    Insikt Group identified eight Candiru-related infrastructure clusters during 2025 and attributed six to specific countries. It assessed one cluster as highly likely associated with a Hungary-based customer.

    Recorded Future Blog
  33. 2025

    GrayBravo introduces CastleLoader

    GrayBravo introduced CastleLoader in early 2025, distributing it through Cloudflare-themed ClickFix attacks and fraudulent GitHub repositories. Multiple independent deployment clusters suggested a malware-as-a-service offering.

    Recorded Future Blog
  34. Nov 2024

    Ngioweb infrastructure disrupted through sinkholing

    A sinkholing operation targeted Ngioweb infrastructure. The botnet subsequently reemerged with changes to its domain-generation algorithms.

    Recorded Future Blog
  35. Date unknown

    Stark Industries rebrands and Aeza transfers hosting resources

    Stark Industries Solutions rebranded as THE.Hosting, while Aeza shifted resources through Smart Digital Ideas DOO and Hypercore Ltd before later transfers to NetCrafters OU. Insikt Group described restructuring and registry-resource transfers as mechanisms for preserving hosting operations.

    Recorded Future Blog
  36. Date unknown

    GrayCharlie compromises WordPress sites for fake-update delivery

    GrayCharlie, overlapping with SmartApeSG, compromised WordPress websites and injected JavaScript that displayed browser-specific fake update prompts. Insikt Group identified two principal NetSupport RAT clusters and assessed that some associated operators were likely Russian-speaking.

    Recorded Future Blog
  37. Date unknown

    TAG-161 uses Booking.com-themed lures to deliver malware

    TAG-161 used Booking.com-themed ClickFix campaigns to deliver CastleLoader and Matanbuchus. Bespoke phishing-management tooling and infrastructure overlaps with BEARHOST-linked networks indicated a sustained, well-resourced operation.

    Recorded Future Blog
  38. Date unknown

    TAG-160 targets US carriers with logistics-themed ClickFix attacks

    TAG-160 used logistics-themed phishing, spoofed senders, typosquatted domains and re-registered logistics-company domains to deliver CastleLoader through ClickFix. The activity also abused access to DAT Freight & Analytics and Loadlink Technologies.

    Recorded Future Blog
  39. Date unknown

    TAG-144 targets South American government entities with AsyncRAT

    TAG-144, overlapping with Blind Eagle, targeted South American government entities with a strong focus on Colombia. Judicial-themed SVG attachments initiated a JavaScript-to-PowerShell chain that extracted a .NET payload from image pixels, with confirmed infections deploying AsyncRAT.

    Recorded Future Blog
  40. Date unknown

    MintsLoader campaigns deliver malware through staged scripts

    MintsLoader supported phishing and drive-by campaigns associated with TAG-124 and other actors. The campaigns used obfuscated JavaScript and PowerShell, sandbox evasion and DGA-based infrastructure to deliver GhostWeaver, StealC and modified BOINC clients.

    Recorded Future Blog
  41. Date unknown

    Insikt Group uncovers additional Predator spyware deployments

    Insikt Group identified previously unreported evidence of Predator use in Mozambique and Pakistan, obtained new deployment evidence in Iraq and linked higher-tier infrastructure to Czech entity FoxITech s.r.o. The operations persisted despite public disclosures and sanctions against the Intellexa Consortium.

    Recorded Future Blog
  42. Date unknown

    Lumma expands GhostSocks integration for backconnect access

    Lumma expanded its GhostSocks integration to offer backconnect access through compromised machines. Insikt Group linked affiliate build ID vcs1q5, associated with blackowl23, to Ngioweb-related addresses.

    Recorded Future Blog
  43. Date unknown

    LummaC2 shifts hosting after disruption

    Following the May 2025 disruption, LummaC2 shifted away from routine Cloudflare concealment toward infrastructure associated with Virtualine Technologies, Aeza and Proton66.

    Recorded Future Blog
Linked entities

Related entities

Vulnerabilities, threat actors, malware, products, organizations, breaches, and observables Mallory has linked to this story. Indicator values are masked here and available in full in the app.

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Organizations

8 linked
SkyLink Data Center BVVMHeavenAnonRDPTechTies Inc.Blatant Technologies, LLCWildserversKittyRDPSMARTNET Germany GmbH

Observables

49 linked

Indicator values are masked on this page. View all 49 in Mallory Domains, IPs, hashes, and URLs are exportable to your SIEM.

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