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Mallory
CriticalPublic exploit

Auth bypass to admin access in ZTE F460/F660 web_shell_cmd.gch (sendcmd)

IdentifiersCVE-2014-2321CWE-306

ZTE F460 and F660 cable modems expose a management endpoint (web_shell_cmd.gch) that accepts "sendcmd" requests without proper authentication, allowing a remote attacker to obtain administrative access. As described, an attacker can issue management commands such as "set TelnetCfg" to enable the device’s TELNET service and set attacker-chosen credentials, effectively granting administrative control over the modem.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Remote, unauthenticated attackers can gain administrative control of affected ZTE F460/F660 devices. This can include enabling remote management services (e.g., TELNET) with attacker-specified credentials, leading to full device compromise and subsequent network manipulation (configuration changes, traffic interception/redirect, and potential downstream compromise depending on deployment).

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Restrict exposure of the modem management interface to trusted management networks only (no WAN/Internet access), and apply ACLs/firewall rules to block access to the vulnerable endpoint. Disable TELNET (and other unnecessary management services) and ensure remote administration is disabled where possible. Monitor for suspicious requests to web_shell_cmd.gch and for unexpected enabling of TELNET or changes to management credentials.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade to a vendor-provided fixed firmware for ZTE F460/F660 that enforces authentication/authorization on web_shell_cmd.gch (sendcmd) and prevents unauthenticated configuration changes such as TelnetCfg modifications. If a fixed firmware is not available, replace affected devices or obtain an ISP/vendor-managed update that removes/locks down the vulnerable endpoint.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.

VALID 1 / 1 TOTALView more in app
ZTE-Vuln-4-SkidsMaturityPoCVerified exploit

This repository is an operational exploit toolkit targeting ZTE routers (exact models unspecified) via a command injection vulnerability on the /web_shell_cmd.gch endpoint over HTTPS (port 443). The main exploit is implemented in Go (zte.go), which reads a list of target IPs from stdin and sends three crafted HTTP POST requests to each target: (1) copying a file on the device, (2) downloading a binary from an attacker-controlled server, and (3) executing the downloaded binary. The payload is designed to compromise the device and likely add it to a botnet. The repository also includes setup scripts (Scanner.sh, zmap.sh) for preparing the attack environment and a password file (pass_file) for brute-force or scanning purposes. The setup.txt file provides step-by-step instructions for attackers to deploy the exploit and integrate compromised devices into a botnet. The exploit requires the attacker to modify the Go source to specify their own server and binary architecture. The attack vector is network-based, requiring access to the target's HTTPS interface. The endpoints and file paths used in the exploit are clearly fingerprintable, and the overall structure is typical of botnet propagation toolkits.

injectionmethodDisclosed Jun 24, 2021gobashnetwork
EXPOSURE SURFACE

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
ZTE CorporationF460hardware
ZTE CorporationF660hardware

Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.

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Threat actor evidence1

Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.

Associated malware1

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Detection signatures1

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Vendor-by-vendor mapping

Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.

Social activity1

Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.