Google Chrome Mojo sandbox escape on Windows
CVE-2025-2783 is a high-severity sandbox escape vulnerability in Mojo, Chromium/Chrome’s inter-process communication framework, affecting Google Chrome on Windows prior to 134.0.6998.177. The issue is described as an incorrect handle / incorrect handle handling flaw in Mojo. Supporting content further indicates the bug involved improper validation of pseudo-handles in Chromium IPC, where process pseudo-handles (-1) were validated while thread pseudo-handles (-2) were overlooked in certain circumstances, enabling manipulation through the ipcz/Mojo IPC path. A remote attacker could trigger the flaw using a malicious file, resulting in escape from the Chrome renderer sandbox on Windows. The vulnerability was exploited in the wild as a zero-day, including in Operation ForumTroll and other espionage activity.
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Impact, mitigation & remediation
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
Impact
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
Mitigation
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Remediation
Patch, then assume compromise.
Exploits
2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (3 hidden).
Repository contains a real Windows Chromium full-chain exploit for CVE-2025-2783 rather than a detector. Structure is simple: README documents the chain, demo/exp.html provides the browser-side trigger and staging logic, and src/ contains the native payload implemented as a Chromium-linked shared library plus an embedded copy of MinHook for runtime API/function detouring. The BUILD.gn file shows the intended build model: compile main.cc into a shared library named exploit_mojo with dependencies on Chromium ipcz and mojo internals. The main exploit capability is sandbox escape followed by native code execution. According to README and visible code, the DLL initializes from DllMain by spawning a thread, locates chrome.dll, resolves version-specific offsets, and uses MinHook to detour internal Chromium/V8 functionality. One hook targets V8Console::Debug so JavaScript in the demo page can pass an ArrayBuffer containing second-stage shellcode into native code. Another hook targets ipcz relay handling (described as OnAcceptRelayedMessage) to craft a spoofed RelayMessage request and obtain a privileged thread handle from a higher-privileged process. The exploit then performs thread hijacking: suspend thread, alter context, and invoke Windows APIs such as VirtualAlloc, ReadProcessMemory, and CreateThread to stage and run shellcode. The browser-side demo is not just a static page; it contains substantial JavaScript/Wasm exploit logic and explicitly fetches windows/shellcode.bin, computes addresses, writes staged code into RWX memory, and signals the native hook path via console.debug. README states the demo should be served locally with python -m http.server and opened at http://127.0.0.1:8000/exp.html. This makes the attack chain a combination of web/browser delivery and local/native post-exploitation on Windows. Notable fingerprintable artifacts include the local demo URL, the fetched shellcode path windows/shellcode.bin, references to payload.bin and shellcode.bin, the target module chrome.dll, and hardcoded supported Chrome versions in g_node_offset_map. The repository is operational but not broadly weaponized: it includes a working payload path and shellcode execution flow, yet relies on hardcoded offsets, Chromium source-tree integration, and a narrow Windows/Chrome compatibility window.
ChromSploit Framework is a modular, extensible exploitation and research platform focused on browser and server vulnerabilities. It provides operational exploit modules for several high-profile CVEs (including Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Tomcat, and Git), with a strong emphasis on safety: all exploits default to simulation mode, and real exploitation requires explicit authorization. The framework supports multi-stage browser exploit chains, advanced payload obfuscation, automated tunneling (ngrok), and C2 integration (Sliver, Metasploit). It includes a professional reporting system, live monitoring, and evidence collection. The repository is well-structured, with clear separation between core logic, modules, exploits, and documentation. Numerous endpoints are fingerprintable, including local HTTP servers for exploit delivery, OAuth phishing, and data exfiltration. The codebase is primarily Python, with supporting JavaScript, JSP, and shell scripts. This framework is suitable for advanced security research, red teaming, and educational demonstrations, but should only be used in authorized, isolated environments due to the presence of real exploit code (even though simulation is the default).
Affected products & vendors
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Recent activity
117 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A high-severity Google Chrome/Chromium sandbox escape zero-day (IPC design/logic flaw) enabling attackers to escape the browser sandbox and inject code into the browser process, leading to arbitrary code execution on Windows in the described attack chain.
A Google Chrome sandbox escape vulnerability exploited as a zero-day to deploy the Trinper backdoor (TaxOff).
Chrome sandbox escape vulnerability described as a zero-day exploited before patching.
A zero-day vulnerability in Google Chrome exploited by the ForumTrol APT group in March 2025 to enable targeted attacks against Russian political scientists and researchers.
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Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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